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COMMENTS
Employer Sanctions for Hiring Illegal
Aliens: A Simplistic Solution to a
Complex Problem
I. INTRODUCTION
United States immigration policy over the course of the last 200
years has evolved from one of open arms to one of racial and qualitative
restrictions to one of qualitative and quantitative restrictions.1 These
shifts, fueled by racism, domestic economic conditions including an end
to war-time labor shortages, and domestic resource limitations, have re-
sulted in an inability to absorb a new wave of immigrants.2 Proposals for
enforcing immigration restrictions through sanctions against employers
who hire undocumented aliens have surfaced periodically since 1951.1
There are an estimated three and one-half to six milliona undocu-
mented aliens5 living in the United States. While nationals from many
1 See Salinas & Torres, The Undocumented Mexican Alien: A Legal, Social and Economic
Analysis, 13 Houston L. Rev. 863, 866-68 (1976). See generally SENATE COMM. ON THE JUDICIARY,
96TH CONG., 2D SESS., SELECTED READINGS ON U.S. IMMIGRATION POLICY AND LAW 436-43
(Comm. Print 1980) [hereinafter cited as SELECTED READINGS].
2 Lansing & Alabart, Reagan Administration Proposals on Immigration: The Problem of the
Undocumented Alien in the US., 13 CAL. W. INT'L L.J. 1, 8 (1983).
3 THE KNOWING EMPLOYMENT OF ILLEGAL IMMIGRANTS: HEARING BEFORE THE SUBCOM-
MITTEE ON IMMIGRATION AND REFUGEE POLICY OF THE SENATE COMM. ON THE JUDICIARY,
97TH CONG., 1ST SESS. 17 (1981) [hereinafter cited as KNOWING EMPLOYMENT].
4 SELECTED READINGS, supra note 1, at 5-10; See also Collin, Immigration Bill Chances Fade,
Chicago Tribune, Oct. 5, 1983, § 1, at 4, col. I (charts growth of entire Hispanic population in the
United States).
5 This comment will use the terms "undocumented" and "illegal" alien interchangeably to refer
to aliens who either are in the United States without the permission of the Immigration and Natural-
ization Service or have violated the conditions of their stay in the United States by working. No
derogatory connotation is meant by "illegal." Of course, it should be noted that an alien is not here
illegally until so judged in a hearing.
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countries reside in the United States as undocumented aliens, approxi-
mately 1.5-2.5 million are Mexican.6  Although Mexicans represent
merely a portion of the illegal flow of immigrants, United States' immi-
gration policy towards Mexico has generally paralleled overall trends.7
This comment will therefore focus on them.
This focus does not presuppose that Cubans, Haitians, Asians and
others do not illegally immigrate and encounter exploitation and discrim-
ination in the United States.8 It also does not overlook the fact that there
are many highly skilled Europeans working in this country illegally.9
Rather, this focus presupposes that Mexicans are most closely identified
with illegal immigration and any attempt to limit their immigration poses
the greatest threat of discrimination to United States citizens - espe-
cially to those of Hispanic ancestry.10
Several factors have led to the current push for sanctions against
employers who hire illegal aliens. One main factor is the perception that
illegal aliens take jobs from United States citizens and legal aliens, work-
ers and negatively affect the national economy. Obviously, any percep-
tion that the jobs of United States citizens are being lost tends to create
an emotionally charged environment that hampers objective decision
making. Further, frustration has built up because current legal mecha-
nisms seem incapable of halting illegal immigration. This frustration has
increased xenophobia. Finally, proponents of sanctions identify a major
inequity in a law which punishes illegal immigrants but provides no sanc-
tions against their employers. The answer, some say, is to end the "pull"
of illegal immigration, i.e. eliminate employment opportunities in the
United States by prohibiting employers from hiring illegals.
Although employer sanctions temporarily satisfy an emotional need
to do something to preserve citizens' jobs from hordes of illegal aliens,
they do not permanently address underlying problems. Congress must
adopt a more sophisticated approach to illegal immigration and recog-
nize the potential pitfalls of employer sanctions. First, no legislative re-
form of immigration law can ignore the fact that the economy is
6 SELECTED READINGS, supra note 1, at 9-10. In 1975, 89% of the illegal aliens arrested were
Mexican nationals. Catz, Regulating the Employment of Illegal Aliens: DeCanas and Section 2805,
17 SANTA CLARA L. REV. 751, 756 n.32 (1977) (citing an Immigration and Naturalization Service
report) [hereinafter cited as Catz].
7 See Salinas, supra note 1, at 868-73.
8 SELECTED READINGS, supra note I, at 20. See also Lansing & Alabart, supra note 2, at 2.
9 Cf. SELECTED READINGS, supra note 1, at 20. For a comparison of how Northern Europe
handles its immigration "problem," see generally Gupte, Germany's Guest Workers, N.Y. Times,
Aug. 19, 1984, 56 (Magazine), at 87.
10 See generally J. CREWDSON, THE TARNISHED DOOR (1983) (profiling the lives of illegal
aliens); see also SELECTED READINGS, supra note 1, at 77-98.
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stratified. There are certain secondary jobs that Americans may be un-
willing to perform, e.g. migrant farm labor, but which are important to
the United States economy and create a multiplier effect. Until Congress
can accurately determine the number of illegal aliens that create or retain
certain jobs in the United States as opposed to the number that take them
away from United States citizens, legislators are operating in the dark.
An effective sanctions program might actually cause a net decrease in
available jobs. Second, Congress must understand that while sanctions
might theoretically end the "pull" to illegal immigration, some immigra-
tion will always result from the "push" of unbearable political and eco-
nomic conditions in the illegals' home country. Thus, the current
employer sanction proposals seem to offer limited hope for accomplish-
ing their purpose and, if successful, might result in consequences which
outweigh any benefits. Indeed, prior legislation has failed.
Finally, the most serious consequence of employer sanctions would
be the resulting discrimination against legal aliens and United States citi-
zens of Hispanic origin. Some employers would try to avoid any legal
liability by refusing work to all foreign-looking applicants. Other em-
ployers would use the fear of sanctions as a cover for discrimination
against Hispanic Americans. Any national counterfeit-proof identifica-
tion system instituted to limit this discrimination or make sanctions more
effective might not, in fact, be foolproof, might be implemented in a dis-
criminatory fashion or might create a "big brother is watching"
syndrome.
Illegal immigration is a divisive issue. In a country comprised of
immigrants, prizing free enterprise, and valuing civil liberties, there are
no easy answers to the question of immigration reform. Yet, three tenets
should guide any search for solutions. First, the dynamics underlying
illegal immigration and the consequences of any proposed legislative
remedies deserve careful study. Second, legislation should only penalize
employers who hire illegal aliens for jobs which legal workers are pre-
pared to take. Third, while the Immigration and Naturalization Service
is far from perfect, enforcement of immigration laws should be kept in
the agency's hands and not those of private parties. At least the Immi-
gration and Naturalization Service's conduct is subject to public scrutiny
and control.
Three observations illustrate the complexity of this issue and the
dynamics surrounding it. First, with a few exceptions," a private em-
I I The two major exceptions are tax withholding and avoiding child labor under 29 U.S.C. § 212
(1982).
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ployer is rarely obligated to actively enforce the law.12 Employer sanc-
tions would, in effect, make employers junior Immigration and
Naturalization Service officers. Second, any employer sanction program
must be viewed in the context of popular perceptions, political, social,
and economic impacts, and other immigration reform.13 As a major
treatise on the subject has stated, "immigration legislation reflects polit-
ical policy."' 14 Finally, the complexity of assumptions about and the im-
pacts of sanctions have given rise to unique coalitions on both sides of the
issue. Groups such as the Mexican American Legal Defense and Educa-
tional Fund (MALDEF) and the United States Chamber of Commerce
oppose sanctions, but the Reagan administration, the Migrant Farm
Workers Union and the National Association for the Advancement of
Colored People support the reform.
15
This Comment divides the study of employer sanctions into four
integrated components. Section II studies the current liability, or lack
thereof, of employers who hire illegal aliens. Given that employers pres-
ently face no real liability, Section III next examines arguments in sup-
port of employer sanctions and outlines the most recent legislation before
Congress. Section IV outlines the effect employer sanctions would have
on employers, legal workers, Hispanic Americans and their civil rights,
and the national economy. The section ends with a critique of any na-
tional identification system that might evolve in an attempt to eliminate
the negative consequences associated with employer sanctions. Section V
reviews some proposed alternatives to the pending employer sanctions
that could better respond to illegal immigration and avoid negative
effects.
II. CURRENT STATE OF EMPLOYER LIABILITY: THE LAW AS A
PAPER TIGER
A. Existing Immigration Sanctions
Current federal law, 8 U.S.C. § 1324, prohibits any person from as-
sisting in the willful or knowledgeable act of or attempt at concealing,
harboring, shielding or inducing entry of an illegal alien into or within
the United States.16 Each violation of this law is a felony that may result
12 See SELECTED READINGS, supra note 1, at 94-121.
13 A 1977 Gallup poll found Americans six to one in favor of employer sanctions. Catz, supra
note 6, at 760 n.55.
14 C. GORDON & H. ROSENFIELD, 1-6 IMMIGRATION LAW AND PROCEDURE (1983).
15 See generally KNOWING EMPLOYMENT, supra note 3.
16 8 U.S.C. § 1324(a) (1982). The 1952 Act corrected a statutory ambiguity that had led the
United States Supreme Court to find that harboring and concealing were not prohibited. C.




in a maxium fine of $2,000 and up to five years imprisonment. 17 There is
no private right of action under this law.18
The statute provides that employment, including the usual and nor-
mal practices incident to employment, shall not constitute "harboring."19
Known as the "Texas proviso," this major exception was written into the
law in part through the efforts of Texan agricultural interests.2' The leg-
islative intent behind the Texas proviso is somewhat ambiguous. Re-
marks in the legislative record indicate that once an employer learns an
employee is an illegal alien, he is liable notwithstanding the Texas pro-
viso.21 But the predominant view holds that while an employer could be
liable for violating other aspects of the act, such as the prohibition
against transporting illegal aliens into the United States,2 2 he would not
be liable for harboring an illegal alien as part of the employment relation-
ship even if the employee's illegal status was known to him.2 3
The courts have held that the Texas proviso does not exempt em-
ployers from liability under § 1324, but rather is a clarification of "har-
boring" and only applies when a defendant tries to establish an
affirmative defense that his acts were part of the usual and normal em-
ployment process.24 So construed, the Texas proviso is not a blanket
shield for employers prosecuted under § 1324.25 A court determines
Herrera v. United States, 208 F.2d 215, 217 (9th Cir. 1954) (the court did not pass on the provision
providing that employment does not constitute harboring).
17 8 U.S.C. § 1324(a) (1982).
18 Chavez v. Freshpict Foods, Inc., 456 F.2d 890 (10th Cir. 1972), cert denied, 409 U.S. 1042
(1972).
19 8 U.S.C. § 1324(a) (1982). The courts have held that this distinction is based on a rational
basis and does not violate equal protection on due process principles. United States v. Lopez, 521
F.2d 437, 441-42 (2nd Cir. 1975), cert denied, 423 U.S. 995 (1975).
20 Comment, Illegal Immigration: Employer Sanctions and Related Proposals, 19 SAN DIEGO L.
REv. 149, 151 n.14 (1981).
21 98 CONG. REC. S794 (Feb. 5, 1952) (statement of Sen. Kilgore of W. Virginia). See also id. at
S811 (statement of Sen. Magnuson of Washington).
22 Id. at S797 (statement of Sen. Kilgore). See U.S. v. Bunker, 532 F.2d 1262 (9th Cir. 1976)
(example of conviction for transporting illegal aliens across the borders). In the abstract all Ameri-
can employers "induce" illegal immigration by providing the perception that employment opportu-
nities exist in the United States.
23 98 CONG. REc. 5803 (Feb. 5, 1952) (statement of Sen. Lehman of New York), see also id.
5806 (statement of Sen. Douglas of Illinois). Sen. Douglas had submitted two amendments to what
is now 8 U.S.C. § 1324 (1982) that would have made knowing employment illegal. Both were de-
feated in the interests of protecting agriculture employers and ensuring the bill's passage. Id. S793-
813. The Act speaks of active illegality, i.e., concealing, harboring, and inducing, not just knowl-
edge. Comment, Regulation of Illegal Aliens: Sanctions Against Employers Who Knowingly Hire
Undocumented Workers, 4 W. ST. U.L. REv. 41, 50 (1976). The proviso is broad and unqualified in
scope. Id. at 50-51.
24 United States v. Herrera, 584 F.2d 1137, 1144 (2d Cir. 1978). As a penal statute, § 1324 is
strictly construed. United States v. Orejel-Tejeda, 194 F. Supp. 140, 143 (N.D. Cal. 1961).
25 United States v. Winnie Mae Mfg. Co., 451 F. Supp. 642, 646-47 (C.D. Cal. 1978) (indictment
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whether the employer has acted within the normal incidents of employ-
ment by comparing the specific facts with the general practices of em-
ployers in the relevant industry.2 6 The government must prove that the
employer substantially facilitated the known illegal alien's stay in the
United States.2 7 For example, in United States v. Herrera,28 the govern-
ment proved that the defendant housed his prostitutes, provided for their
possible escape, instructed them to say they were Puerto Ricans, and
forewarned them of an Immigration and Naturalization Service raid.29
Similarly, in United States v. Winnie Mae,3 ° the government proved that
the employer provided a hiding place for his illegal aliens.3 '
Other sections of the immigration laws narrow the applicability of
the Texas proviso. For example, it is a crime for an employer to hire and
harbor illegal aliens to act as prostitutes or for other immoral purposes.32
In addition, the immigration laws impose an obligation on transit compa-
nies to prevent their employees and customers from using the transit
company as a means of facilitating immigration law violations.
33
B. Farm Labor Contractor Sanctions
Congress, in 29 U.S.C. § 1816, has prohibited farm labor contrac-
tors from recruiting or employing aliens known to lack Immigration and
Naturalization Service permission to work in the United States.34 A con-
tractor may present a good faith defense showing that he relied on appro-
priate documentation and had no reason to suspect that he had hired an
illegal alien.35 But the narrow scope of the prohibition 36 and the lack of
was dismissed because key witnesses for the defendants were returned to Mexico before the defend-
ants could interview them, thus denying the defendants their due process rights).
26 Herrera, 584 F.2d at 1144; United States v. Mount Fuji Japanase Steak House, Inc., 435 F.
Supp. 1194, 1202 (E.D.N.Y. 1977).
27 Herrera, 584 F.2d at 1144-45.
28 Id. at 1141-50.
29 Id.
30 Winnie Mae Mfg. Co., 451 F. Supp. 642.
31 Id. at 644.
32 8 U.S.C. § 1328 (1982) (provides that a violation must include the illegal importation of the
alien prostitute). Id.
33 8 U.S.C. § 1286 (1982) (owner or agent of transit vessel may not pay off or discharge an alien
crewman without Immigration and Naturalization Service approval); 8 U.S.C. § 1287 (1982) (owner
or agent of transit company prohibited from bringing into the United States an alien "crewman"
where owner or agent intends to assist the alien in evading immigration laws); 8 U.S.C. § 1323
(1982) (transit Company and its employees liable if either bring into the United States a passenger
lacking Immigration and Naturalization Service approval; scienter not required).
34 29 U.S.C. § 1816(a) (1982). A "farm labor contractor" is a person other than an agricultural
employer or association, who, for consideration, contracts farm labor). 29 U.S.C. § 1802(7) (1982).
35 29 U.S.C. § 1816(b) (1982).
36 29 U.S.C. § 1816 (1982) only applies to one type of employer in one field of commerce. Fur-
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enforcement efforts37 have resulted in no prosecutions under § 1816.38
C. State Sanctions
Sanctions against employers who hire illegal aliens exist in at least
11 states.3 9 California has the best known of these statutes. It provides
that "no employer shall knowingly employ an alien who is not entitled to
lawful residence in the United States if such employment would have an
adverse effect on lawful workers."' Violators face $200-$500 fines and
additional civil actions4' such as private tort claims for unfair competi-
tion and interference with employment rights.42 Until recently, the
United States Supreme Court prohibited state regulation over immigra-
tion and viewed it as part of foreign commerce over which Congress had
exclusive control.43 In 1976, the Supreme Court modified this position
and upheld the California employer sanctions statute.44
ther, many contractors of farm labor are excluded from its provisions. E.g., 29 U.S.C. § 1803 (1982)
(exempts family businesses, many small businesses, common carriers, labor organization and part-
time agricultural employers or association contractors).
37 See KNOWING EMPLOYMENT, supra note 3, at 141 (statement of J. Otero, Vice-Chairman of
the Labor Council for Latin American Advancement ("LCLAA")).
38 There seem to be no recorded cases relying on 29 U.S.C. § 1816 (1982) even though its lan-
guage could be construed as providing a private right of action. See 29 U.S.C. § 1816(a) (1982) ("No
farm labor contractor shall recruit, hire, employ, or use, with knowledge, the services of any individ-
ual who is an alien not lawfully admitted for permanent residence or who has not been authorized by
the Attorney General to accept employment"). While one source cites figures of 10,190 illegal aliens
apprehended, 370 contractors charged and $1,407,650 in damages attributable to the Act's enforce-
ment, these figures probably cover all the Act's provisions. KNOWING EMPLOYMENT, supra note 3,
at 41-42.
39 CAL. LAB. CODE § 2805 (West Supp. 1984); 31 CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 51k (West Supp.
1984); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 19, § 705 (1979); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 448.09 (West 1981); KAN. STAT.
ANN. tit. 21, § 4409 (1981); ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 26, § 871 (West Supp. 1932); MASS. GEN.
LAWS ANN. ch. 39, § 2-305 (West 1981); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 275-A:4a (1979 Supp); VT.
STAT. ANN. tit. 21, § 444a (1978); VA. CODE § 40.1-11.1 (1981).
40 CAL. LAB. CODE § 2805(a) (West Supp. 1984).
41 Id. § 2805 (b)-(c).
42 Comment, supra note 23, at 59-60; see Catz, supra note 6, at 774; cf Larez v. Oberti, 23 Cal.
App. 3d 217, 100 Cal. Rptr. 57 (1972) (Class action by resident farm workers against farm operator
and labor contractor for unfair competition, interference with employment, and violations of the
Immigration and Nationality Act.)
[T]he interference count failed because the plaintiffs did not establish the certainty of their
employment. [T]he plaintiffs also failed to prove conspiracy. [Tihe state court found an injunc-
tive remedy inappropriate here for the following reasons: only a federal court can imply a
remedy based on a federal statute, federal action would be more appropriate, policy dictated
against equitable relief, and § 2805 would provide possible relief in the future.
Id.
43 C. GORDON & H. ROSENFIELD, supra note 14, at 1-33 to -37.
44 In Dolores Canning Co. v. Howard, 40 Cal. App. 3d 673, 115 Cal. Rptr. 435 (1974), the court
found that Cal. Lab. Code § 2805 interfered with Congress' exclusive right to regulate immigration,
that § 2805 was void for vagueness, and fell outside state police powers. But cf. Decanas v. Bica, 424
U.S. 351 (1976), where the Court distinguished between an immigration rule and state regulation
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Employer sanctions in California and other states have been ineffec-
tive, perhaps due to their low enforcement priority among police and to
confusion surrounding what constitutes a good faith attempt at compli-
ance.45 In the absence of a clear understanding of when any employer has
violated the law and is without a defense, police are hesitant to prosecute.
Further, the need for uniform federal laws seems evident given the inter-
state nature of illegal labor movements. Many states, even ones with
their own sanctions, seem to be counting on federal employer sanctions
to discourage employment of illegals.4 6
D. Related Federal Laws
Employers presently face a battery of federal laws regulating em-
ployer-employee relations: the Fair Labor Standards Act;47 minimum
wage requirements; 48 safety requirements; 49 various unemployment, so-
cial security and federal tax provisions;50 and the certification process for
alien workers.51 Many assume that illegal aliens are employed primarily
because they are willing to work for below minimum wage and under
unsafe conditions. 2 If such is the case, enforcement of existing labor
laws will end employers' incentive to hire illegal aliens because illegals'
that has only an indirect effect on immigration and that supplements federal law. DeCanas v. Bica,
424 U.S. 351 (1976). In Decanas, migrant farm workers had sued farm labor contractors who re-
fused them employment because the contractor had already hired known illegals. Id. at 353. The
Court upheld state employer sanctions as long as they were not preempted by Congressional legisla-
tion. Id. at 357. Inexplicably, California has yet to use Decanas to overturn Delores, so § 2805 lies
legally dormant. Catz, supra note 6, at 766-67; Kutchins & Tweedy, No Two Ways About It: Em-
ployer Sanctions versus Labor Law Protections for Undocumented Workers, 5 INDUS. REL. LJ. 339,
349 (1983).
45 A 1980 Government Accounting Office report, ILLEGAL ALIENS: ESTIMATING THEIR IM-
PACT ON THE UNITED STATES, found that out of 11 states, only one $250 fine had resulted from
employer sanctions and only two other cases were then pending. KNOWING EMPLOYMENT, supra
note 3, at 146. As a result of little experience in using the sanctions, a lack of information, low law
enforcement priority, and a lack of funding, all the sanctions lack utilization. Id. at 145-46.
46 Id.
47 Fair Labor Standards Act of 1938, 29 U.S.C. §§ 201-219 (1982).
48 29 U.S.C. § 206 (1982).
49 29 U.S.C. §§ 651-678 (1982).
50 26 U.S.C. §§ 3101-3507 (1982); see Gates v. Rivers Construction Co., 515 P.2d 1020 (Ala.
1973) (a Canadian, whose wages were placed in a trust until he obtained a visa pursuant to his
contract, should receive his wages when he obtains a visa even though the contract is illegal).
51 8 U.S.C. § 1184 (1982). To give the law teeth and stop the mockery of having employer
violators just rehire another illegal alien, the Department of Labor currently suspends an employer's
labor certification for three years. There are possible due process problems here. See Flicker &
Vazzana, Labor Aspects of Immigration Law 36-41, 1969 PRACTICING LAW INsTrruTE, Corporate
Law and Practice, Transcript Series No. 4.




labor will cost no less than legal residents' labor.13 Currently, effective
enforcement seems to be lacking,5 4 hence the call for employer sanctions
either as a substitute for or supplement to existing laws. 5
Ironically, worker protection statutes and court decisions also pro-
tect illegals to some degree. Employers may be found liable to employees
for breach of contract and to the National Labor Relations Board for
unfair labor practices even when the employees involved are illegal aliens
facing deportation. 6 An admittedly deportable alien, who sues for
breach of an employment contract, must be granted a stay of deportation
in order to pursue his contract claim. 7 Further, one commentator has
noted that "workers who lack papers may nevertheless form and join
unions, elect bargaining representatives and enforce minimum wage,
maximum hour, and occupational safety and health statutes," since
courts "assert that extending these protections serves both to implement
the policies of the Labor Act and to prevent substitution of undocu-
mented workers for legal workers ... ."I
For example, in Amay's Bakery and Noodle Co., the company dis-
charged several undocumented workers who had participated in a suc-
cessful attempt to install Teamsters Local 630 as their collective
53 See infra notes 346-47.
54 KNOWING EMPLOYMENT, supra note 3, at 42-43 (Sen. Kennedy noting the lack of enforce-
ment of existing labor laws and calling for increased use of these laws instead of new employer
sanctions.); see infra notes 346-47. However, the Department of Labor's Employers of Undocu-
mented Workers Program is using 260 officers to enforce the Fair Labor Standards Act against
companies with low wages and high turnover. Since mid-1978, the program has uncovered $3.7
million in wage law violations. Pandya, Berzinsaki, & Parker, Illegal Immigration: An Alternative
Perspective (1981) (paper submitted by Georgetown University Institute for Public Policy) [hereinaf-
ter cited as KNOWING EMPLOYMENT - ALT. PERSP.], reprinted in KNOWING EMPLOYMENT, supra
note 3, at 322, 353-54. For a further evaluation of the effectiveness of Employers of Undocumented
Workers, the referrals to Immigration and Naturalization Service, and the potential for improve-
ments, see infra notes 353-55. The Immigration and Naturalization Service claims success in operat-
ing "operation cooperation," where employers voluntarily allow the Service to pre-screen and refer
applicants. KNOWING EMPLOYMENT, supra note 3, at 3-5 (testimony of Doris Meissner, Acting
Commissioner, Immigration and Naturalization Service).
55 See infra notes 81-88 and accompanying text.
56 See infra notes 317-23 and accompanying text for a discussion of how employer sanctions
could end this liability. Minimum wage and Occupational Safety and Health Act standards do apply
to undocumented aliens (unless the worker is involved in certain restaurant work or wage-by-item
picked work found in agriculture). KNOWING EMPLOYMENT, supra note 3, at 97-98.
57 Hong v. Agency For Int'l Dev., 470 F.2d 507 (9th Cir. 1972) (there is no need to exhaust
administrative appeals where the alien admits his illegal status and his claim is outside Immigration
and Naturalization Service jurisdiction); cf Bolanas v. Kiley, 509 F.2d 1023 (2d Cir. 1975) (plaintiff
seeking to enjoin his deportation because of an intended civil rights suit against the New York City
Police Dept. was denied; deportation enjoined only in extraordinary circumstances).
58 Kutchins & Tweedy, supra note 44, at 341.
59 227 N.L.R.B. 214, 94 L.R.RM. 1165 (1976).
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bargaining agent.60 Here, the administrative law judge ordered the com-
pany to stop harassing the union. 61 In addition, the National Labor Re-
lations Board on review found that California Labor Code § 2805 did not
preclude a reinstatement with backpay for all discharged employees.62
Moreover, in Sure-Tan, Inc. v. National Labor Relations Board,6 3
the Court found that the Board's power to certify a collective-bargaining
representative and provide certain remedies for constructive discharges
applies to employers of illegal aliens.64 The Court first held that illegal
aliens, who cast the majority of votes electing the union, were "employ-
ees" under the Labor Act and eligible to vote because the Act did not
exclude aliens and because the National Labor Relations Board had a
long standing policy of including them.65 The Court noted that the Im-
migration and Nationality Act did not contain employer sanctions.66
The Act does not explicitly prohibit undocumented aliens from voting
and working in Board elections.67  The Court observed that illegal alien
employees can depress working conditions for citizens and legal aliens
and decrease the effectiveness of unions.68 But, "[i]f an employer realizes
that there will be no advantage under the N.L.R.A. in preferring illegal
aliens to legal resident workers, any incentive to hire such illegal aliens is
correspondingly lessened" and thus the incentive to enter the United
States illegally is lessened.69
Finally, the Court upheld a National Labor Relations Board finding
that an employer's sending of a letter to the Immigration and Naturaliza-
tion Service requesting a check of his employees' status, when done only
in retaliation for union organizing, constitutes constructive discharge and
an unfair labor practice if it results in deportation.7" The Court held that
the discharged illegal alien employees were entitled to reinstatement, sub-




63 Sure-Tan, Inc. v. National Labor Relations Board, 104 S. Ct. 2803 (1984) (plurality opinion)
(remanded for appropriate remedial order by the National Labor Relations Board).
64 Id.
65 Id. at 2808-09.
66 See id. at 2809.
67 National Labor Relations Board v. Sure-Tan, Inc., 583 F.2d 355, 359 (7th Cir. 1978), modi-
fied, 104 S. Ct. 2803 (1984). Following past practice, the Court of Appeals found that the union
voted in by the Sure-Tan, Inc. workers still represented the employees even though a majority or the
workers who voted for the union had been deported. Id. at 361.
68 Sure-Tan, Inc., 104 S. Ct. at 2809.
69 Id. at 2810.
70 Id. at 2806, 2810-11 (the court made note of the employers previous knowledge of his employ-
ees' illegal status, which was not brought out until after the election).
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liable under immigration law or result in the discharged employees' re-
claiming their jobs as illegal aliens.71 The Court rejected the Court of
Appeals modification of the Board's order that had provided for the
Board to require the employer to draft the reinstatement offers in Span-
ish, ensure verification of receipt, and keep the offers open for four
years. 72 The Court severely limited back pay by making it applicable
only to the time in which the discharged employees were "available" for
work, i.e., legally admitted into the United States.73 The Court of Ap-
peals had held that the policies of the National Labor Relations Act
would be best carried out if minimum back pay awards were made for
the period that employees might reasonably have remained employed
without independent Immigration and Naturalization Service apprehen-
sion, i.e., six months.74 The Supreme Court rejected this remedy on
three grounds: that it impermissibly substituted a judicial judgment for
the Board's determination as to how best to effectuate National Labor
Relations Act policy, that it provided a back pay remedy for a specula-
tive injury, and that it provided back pay to employees who were not
legally available for work.75 The Court acknowledged that this reversal
eliminated the most potent remedies and penalties under the National
Labor Relations Act, but it pointed out that the cease and desist order
still stood and could be enforced through contempt proceedings.76 The
Court held that any deficiencies in the Act's enforcement mechanism
needed Congressional correction.7 7
In sum, the law's current ambiguity and ambivalence, combined
with its ineffectiveness, has created the need for reform.
71 Id. at 2815.
72 Id. at 2816.
73 Id. at 2815.
74 Id. at 2808.
75 Id. at 2812-15. The dissent maintained that the National Labor Relations Board had fully
acquiesced in the Court of Appeals remedy and so the Court should apply a deferential standard in
reviewing the remedy. Id. at 2817-20 (Brennan, J. dissenting). The Court should defer to the
Board's reasonable estimation of the proper back pay award along with the policy of forgiving peri-
ods of unavailability that are due to the illegal conduct of the employer. Id. at 2818 (Brennan, J.
dissenting). Finally, "Once employers, such as petitioner, realize that they may violate the N.L.R.A.
with respect to their undocumented alien employees without fear of having to recompense those
workers for lost pay, their incentive to hire such illegal aliens' will not decline, it will increase." Id. at
2819 (Brennan, . dissenting).
76 Id. at 2815-16 n.13.
77 Id.
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III. PENDING LEGISLATION: BRINGING ALICE OUT OF
WONDERLAND?
A. Policy Arguments
The arguments cited in Congress for imposing civil and criminal
penalties against employers who hire undocumented workers fall into
four categories: philosophical, pragmatic, economic, and social.
Senator Simpson of Wyoming, the Senate's principal sponsor of em-
ployer sanctions, has cited as inequitable the legal inconsistency in the
current law which makes it illegal for an undocumented alien to work in
the United States but imposes no penalty on the employer who hires
him.7" Furthermore, Senator Simpson identifies as a serious problem the
fact that "we [are] no longer able to fulfill the first duty of a sovereign
nation: control of our borders."79 Finally, the Wyoming Senator has
asked rhetorically:
[H]ow are we ever going to enforce laws on our books when it is legal for an
employer to hire an illegal but it is illegal for the illegal to work? You can
not bring Alice out of Wonderland when you have a law on the books of the
United States like that.80
Employer sanctions' opponents argue that sanctions are based only
on a sense of symbolism: "a need to do something even if there is little
chance of the proposal having any real effect.""1 One Reagan adminis-
tration official is said to have explained the support for employer sanc-
tions as an effort to "create an image of control." 2 Opponents also argue
that if employer sanctions fail, disrespect for the law will only increase.83
It is the current immigration and labor law's failure to stem the tide
of illegal immigration that has caused the movement for employer sanc-
tions.8 4 Sanctions' advocates contend that the Immigration and Natural-
ization Service needs more than just border patrols and spot raids to end
illegal immigration and employment because employers depend on a flow
of new illegal alien employees to replace those deported.85 They also
assert that labor law enforcement is no answer for those illegal aliens
78 129 CONG. REc. S6918 (daily ed. May 18, 1983).
79 Simpson, Immigration Reform and Control, 34 LAB. L.J. 195 (1983).
80 129 CONG. Rac., supra note 78, at S6918.
81 Remis & Parker, Cost-Benefit Analysis of President Reagan's Employer Sanctions Proposal
(1981) (paper submitted by Georgetown University Institute for Public Representation) [hereinafter
cited as KNOWING EMPLOYMENT - CosT BENEFIT] reprinted in KNOWING EMPLOYMENT, supra
note 3, at 252.
82 Id.
83 KNOWING EMPLOYMENT, supra note 3, at 230-231 (testimony of D. Parker).
84 See supra notes 36-38, 45, 54 and accompanying text.




taking well paying American jobs.8 6 In sum, the primary argument for
sanctions rests fundamentally on ending the "pull" of illegal
immigration:
8 7
Employment is the magnet that attracts aliens here illegally or, in the case
of nonimigrants [visiting aliens, e.g., students], leads them to accept em-
ployment in violation of their status. Employers will be deterred by such a
Federal law from hiring unauthorized aliens and thus, in turn, will deter
aliens from entering illegally or violating their status in search of
employment.
88
Sanctions' proponents rely, in large part, on the controversial as-
sumption that undocumented aliens take jobs away from Americans and
that sanctions will effectively restore these jobs.89 Illegal workers are es-
timated to displace anywhere from 50,000 legal workers at a cost to the
United States of $350 million a year 90 to approximately one million legal
workers at a cost to the United States of $30 billion a year.91 Further,
studies indicate that illegal workers decrease wages and lower working
conditions of United States citizens. 92 It is because undocumented work-
ers fear deportation and because they face such bleak conditions in their
home country that employers can so easily exploit them.93 Many propo-
nents of sanctions say that without illegal workers to exploit, employers
will have to increase wages and improve job conditions94 to the benefit of
America's most vulnerable workers: minorities and those with few
skills.95 In addition, employers will no longer have the legal option of
86 See infra notes 328-29, 356-60, 373-79 and accompanying text.
87 The minimum wage in the United States is up to 10 times greater than the comparable wage in
Mexico, a country with very high unemployment. H.R. REP. Doc. No. 115.1, 98th CONG., 1st Sess.
95 (1983) (Department of Labor testimony); See generally text accompanying note 345 [hereinafter
cited as H.R. REP. No. 115.1].
88 H.R. REP. No. 115.1, supra note 87. *See infra notes 324-45 and accompanying text for a full
discussion of the arguments in support of and against this key assumption.
89 See KNOWING EMPLOYMENT, supra note 3, at 8; see generally infra notes 328-32 and accom-
panying text.
90 KNOWING EMPLOYMENT, supra note 3, at 53-54 (testimony of L. Fuchs, former executive
director of the Select Committee on Immigration).
91 Id. at 69. (testimony of R. Oswald, Director, Department of Economic Research, AFL-CIO).
This estimate is based in part on the fact that the Immigration and Naturalization Service appre-
hended almost one million illegal aliens in 1980. Id. at 72.
92 Id. at 220. (testimony of D. North, New Transcentury Foundation). Testimony cited the
severe impact on Americans' job opportunities in areas bordering Mexico; Salinas, supra note 1, at
876-78.
93 See Salinas & Torres, supra note 1, at 865.
94 See KNOWING EMPLOYMENT, supra note 3, at 179-80 (testimony of M. Cooper of the Na-
tional Urban League). Also, employers no longer will be able to pocket the wages of deported aliens.
See Catz, supra note 6, at 754-55.
95 KNOWING EMPLOYMENT, supra note 3, at 21 (testimony of M. Lovell, Under Secretary, De-
partment of Labor).
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using undocumented aliens as strike breakers.96 Finally, proponents of
sanctions argue that effective sanctions will stop the unfair competition
now imposed against employers hiring only legal workers and employing
them under non-exploitative conditions.97
Proponents of sanctions maintain that sanctions that decrease the
number of illegal workers also will improve the United States' macro
economy and decrease government deficits. 98 Their argument is multi-
fold. First, many undocumented workers fail to pay income taxes, result-
ing in a loss of at least $115 million annually in government revenue. 99
Second, undocumented aliens send much of their pay to their homeland
resulting in balance of payment problems for the United States."o Third,
undocumented workers directly cost government agencies money for var-
ious social services that they utilize and indirectly cost more money in
welfare and unemployment benefits to displaced legal workers, estimated
to cost $.7 billion annually in additional unemployment compensation. 101
Proponents of sanctions also maintain that a sanction program that
is perceived as effective could decrease xenophobia in the United
States."' 2  They reason that Americans would no longer suspect legal
aliens and Hispanic Americans of being undocumented aliens. 10 3 Fur-
ther, some advocates argue that effective sanctions could assist the assim-
ilation of Hispanic Americans into society's mainstream"4 by reinforcing
"American" traditions and the use of the English language.105 Finally,
some proponents maintain that if sanctions were combined with amnesty
for many illegals now in the United States, current exploitation might
end because current illegal workers could assert their legal rights without
96 Salinas & Torres, supra note 1, at 883.
97 KNOWING EMPLOYMENT, supra note 3, at 68 (AFL-CIO testimony).
98 See Salinas & Torres, supra note 1, at 876.
99 Id. at 880. The figure is given in 1976 dollars. Id.
100 Id. at 880, 879-80.
101 H.R. REP. No. 115.1, supra note 87, at 97 (Department of Labor testimony). Of course,
illegal aliens may become a greater burden on government agencies if they remain in the United
States without finding work because of the sanctions.
102 KNOWING EMPLOYMENT, supra note 3, at 24; Salinas, supra note 1, at 881; cf. infra notes
221-35 and accompanying text.
103 Cf. Chicago Tribune, Feb. 22, 1984, at 1, col. 1 (immigration officer deports a 14-year-old
American Hispanic after allegedly ignoring his offer of proof of legal residences and after fearful boy
signed a waiver of his rights).
104 Salinas & Torres, supra note 1, at 882.
105 See Id.; KNOWING EMPLOYMENT, supra note 3, at 54 (testimony of L. Fuchs). This argu-
ment assumes that there are "mainstream" American values and that maintaining the Hispanic tra-
dition is undesirable for Hispanics and Americans. If a constant stream of Mexican immigrants




fear of deportation 10 6 and increase their voting strength. 10 7
B. The Provisions of Current Sanction Legislation
The latest Congressional attempt to impose employer sanctions, part
of the Immigration and Reform Act of 1983,108 is far from the first.10 9
Sponsored by Senator Simpson and Representative Mazzoli and sup-
ported by the Reagan Administration, the legislation got off to a strong
start with a 76-18 approval in the Senate in May 1983.110 Notwithstand-
ing House Speaker O'Neill's initial attempt to keep the bill in committee
and off the House floor,111 the House approved the bill 216-211 on June
20, 1984.112 The bill died when House and Senate conferees could not
resolve their differences before the October 1984 recess,113 but the bill
will be resurrected in the upcoming session.114 The constitutional power
to enact such legislation, however, has never been seriously questioned
because
the Supreme Court [has consistently] pointed out it was possible to imply
the power to regulate immigration from the specific directives in the Consti-
tution to regulate foreign commerce, to declare war, to make treaties, to
establish a uniform rule of naturalization, to prohibit the importation of
persons, [and] to make all necessary and proper laws." 5
Employer sanctions are simply an extension of Congress' power to
exclude aliens who negatively affect American labor.116 The Simpson-
Mazzoli bills contain a package of reforms to the Immigration and Na-
tionality Act.117 The provisions imposing employer sanctions should be
viewed in terms of the entire reform package because the elements com-
106 KNOWING EMPLOYMENT, supra note 3, at 44-45 (opening statement of Sen. Kennedy).
107 See Salinas & Torres, supra note 1, at 883.
108 S529, 98th CONG., 1st SEss. (1983) (Simpson bill); H.R. 1510, 98th CONG., 1st SaSS. (1983)
(Mazzoli bill).
109 See supra text accompanying note 3.
110 Wall St. J., Oct. 4, 1983, at 7, col. 1 (midwest ed.).
111 Id. Some reasons for the Speaker's actions may include strong opposition from Hispanic
groups, a key Democratic constituency, and the threat of a veto from President Reagan for cost
containment or purely political reasons. Id.
112 N.Y. Times, June 21, 1984, at 1, col. 6.
113 Telephone interview with staff of Senate Subcommittee on Immigration and Refugee Policy of
Senate Committee on the Judiciary (Oct. 18, 1984) [hereinafter cited as Interview].
114 Id. (Senator Simpson has already promised to introduce his bill in the next Congress).
115 C. GORDON & H. ROSENFIELD, supra note 14, at 1-34; cf. INS v. Chadha, 51 U.S.L.W. 4907
(U.S. June 23, 1983) (No. 80-1832, 2170, 2171) (a legislative veto used to overrule administrative
agency or executive department actions is an unconstitutional violation of separation of powers but
the legislative veto provision of the Immigration and Nationality Act was severable).
116 Comment, The Right of Undocumented Aliens Against Their Employers, 10 FORDHAM UR-
BAN L.J. 683, 687 (1982) (citing 8 U.S.C. § 1182 labor certification provisions).
117 See 129 CONG. REc., supra note 78, S6970-6986 for Senate version that requires illegal aliens
to have entered the United States prior to January 1980 to have a chance of becoming legalized
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plement each other."' The House version makes the following amend-
ments in addition to employer sanctions:" 9
* Section 102 extends criminal penalties for falsification of immigration-
related documents to include specific pieces of identification and provides
criminal penalties for the knowing use of false identification to satisfy em-
ployment verification and increases fines.1
20
* Section 113 provides for the option of alien user fees to cover border
facility expenses.
121
0 Section 121 provides an expedited process for excluding aliens admis-
sion into the United States.
122
* Section 107 creates a United States Immigration Review Board and a
system of Administrative Law Judges below it. 123 The Board will review
fines and other matters but not overturn an Administrative Law Judge's
finding of fact unless it is unsupported by "reasonable, substantial, and pro-
bative evidence in the whole record."'124
• Sections 123 and 124 contain procedures for considering and reviewing
asylum applications.
12 5
* Section 211 creates a separate H-2 temporary worker program and tran-
sitional agricultural worker program whereby the Secretary of Labor con-
siders applications for laborers and assesses whether domestic labor is
unavailable or will be negatively affected by foreign labor.12 6 The Secretary
also ensures that temporary workers will not be used as strike breakers
before issuing certification.127 The Attorney General must establish docu-
ments for temporary employees to present to employers and the documents
must reference any limits on the alien's temporary work status. 128 The Sec-
retary of Labor may impose civil monetary penalties against employers to
assure compliance. 1
29
* Section 245 allows the Attorney General to grant "permanent resident
alien" status to illegal aliens who establish that they had entered the United
States prior to January 1, 1982 and have resided continuously in the United
aliens. Also, the Senate version restricts aliens' eligibility for federal assistance to a greater degree
than the House version. Id.
118 For a survey of variations in past reform legislation, see Smith & Mendez, Employer Sanctions
and Other Labor Market Restrictions on Alien Employment: The "Scorched Earth" Approach to
Immigration Control, 6 N.C. J. INT'L L & COM. REG. 19, 19-31 (1980).
119 H.R. REP. No. 115.1, supra note 87, at 1-30 (text of H.R. 1510). Here, the "House version"
means the bill as reported out by the Committee on the Judiciary of the House on May 13, 1983.













States since then and without having any felony convictions x30 Under the
bill actually passed by the full House, such undocumented aliens would be
legal temporary residents for two years and then become permanent resi-
dents if they were studying English and United States history and govern-
ment.131 For five years after permanent resident status, these legalized
aliens are not eligible for most federal financial assistance except old age,
blindness, disability or emergency medical coverage.
132
e Sections 201-205 and 210 reform legal immigration by setting new nu-
merical quotas, changing certain rules governing the classification of aliens
and requiring regular presidential reports on the impacts of immigration. 
133
e Section 114 restricts warrantless entry into the fields by the Immigra-
tion and Naturalization Service in searching for illegal aliens in outdoor
agricultural operations.
134
e Sections 274(A),(C),(G); 303 provide states with funding to help offset
the costs of the program and require the preparation of certain reports to
Congress.135
The Senate's Simpson bill generally tracts the above provisions with
two exceptions. First, the Senate does not describe the new United States
Immigration Board as an independent agency of the Justice Depart-
ment. 136 Second, the Senate provides for permanent resident status to all
illegal aliens who entered the United States before January 1, 1977 and
temporary resident status changing in three years to permanent resident
status to all illegal aliens arriving in the United States between January 1,
1977 and December 31, 1979.137
The Senate's version of employer sanctions, which is similar to the
House version, proposes making the following amendments to the Immi-
gration and Nationality Act:
138
* Section 274A makes it unlawful for any person to hire or recruit for
consideration an alien that he knows is not authorized to work in the
United States. 13 9 An employer who knows that an employee hired after the
Act has now become illegal must dismiss the worker. 14 All employers ex-
cept those with three or less employees, when hiring any new employee,
must attest that they have examined the individual's United States passport,
social security card or United States birth certificate, and alien employment
130 Id.
131 H.R. 1510, 98th Cong., 2d Sess., 130 CONG. REc. 6166-85 (1984) [hereinafter cited as H.R.
1510].




136 S529, 98th Cong., 1st Sess., 129 CONG. Rxc. 6970-86 (1983).
137 Id.
138 Id. at 6970-72 (text of section 274A of § 529). The Simpson-Mazzoli bill would be inserted
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eligibility card or driver's license. 141 Employers must attest that the appli-
cant is legally eligible for employment and retain a copy of that record.142
If the identification reasonably appears on its face to be genuine, then the
employer has complied and established a good faith affirmative defense. 143
After three years, the President is authorized, subject to a legislative veto,
to institute a form of fraud-proof identification that shall be limited in use
for implementing this scheme of employer verification. 144
* Section 274A also states that violations of the prohibition against hiring
unauthorized aliens will result in a civil penalty of $1,000 per illegal alien
for first offenders and $2,000 per illegal alien thereafter. 145 Where a pattern
or practice of violations is established over 18 months and the employer
receives notice, then the employer faces a $1,000 fine per undocumented
worker and up to 6 months imprisonment per illegal alien. 14 6 The Attor-
ney General may also request equitable relief.147 Failure simply to go
through applicant screening procedures can result in a fine of $500 per
individual. 148
e Section 274A requires that before any fines are assessed, the employer
receive notice, an opportunity for an administrative hearing and, in the suit
to collect the fine, judicial review by a federal district court that will uphold
the administrative decision if supported by substantial evidence on the rec-
ord as a whole. 149
* Section 274A also explicitly pre-empts state employer sanctions, 150 re-
quires presidential monitorig 1 -5' delays implementation, 15 2 orders the At-
torney General to disseminate information on the law, 153 eliminates
duplicative penalties in the Farm Labor Contractors Act,154 and makes a
disclaimer that the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission is not lim-
ited by the bill.
155
There are five key differences between the House version imposing
employer sanctions and the Senate version.1 56 First, in the House ver-
sion, the Attorney General must establish a method to validate the social
















156 It is not the intent to have sanctions apply to "casual hiring" where no employer-employee




employers can call to confirm social security numbers. This will provide
a method for employers to achieve complete immunity.157  Second, the
bill passed by the House prohibits discrimination by employers against
United States citizens or legal aliens based on national origin or alien
status.158 Third, the House version specifically repeals the Texas pro-
viso.' 59 Fourth, in the House version Administrative Law Judges, as op-
posed to just existing immigration officers,"6 are specifically provided for
throughout the proceedings. Fifth, the House bill provides for a six-
month, in contrast to the Senate's twelve-month, transition period before
penalties become effective. 16 ' But the House only provides for a warning
after a first offense and never imposes criminal sanctions.' 62
The House-Senate conferees could resolve only some of the differ-
ences between the two Immigration Reform Act bills. The conferees ac-
cepted the Senate version of employment sanctions including the
provision for criminal penalties.' 63 They compromised by allowing only
a warning for an employer's first offense during the first two and one-half
years after enactment. 6' They also applied the sanctions to all employ-
ers, even those of three or fewer workers, although these employers had
no reporting responsibilities. 65 The conferees compromised on the am-
nesty provisions, providing for permanent resident status to all illegal
aliens in the United States prior to 1977 and temporary resident status to
all undocumented aliens arriving in the United States prior to 198 1.166
But Senate conferees refused to accept the House provision extending
protection against discrimination to legal aliens and providing for a spe-
cial Counsel at the United States Immigration Board to police discrimi-
nation of employers of four to fourteen workers.' 67 The House conferees
could not agree with the Senate's reimbursement plan to states imple-
menting the Act because the Senate provided less than 100%
reimbursement.1
68
157 H.R. 1510, supra note 131.
158 Id.; see infra note 288 and accompanying text.
159 H.R. REP. No. 115.1, supra note 87, at 7-8 (section 112); see supra notes 20-33 and accompa-
nying text. Section 112(1) could cause non-enforcement of the employer sanctions if 8 U.S.C. § 1324
(1982) penalties are deemed too severe because the Justice Department may not want to prosecute
employers when criminal penalties could be so quickly imposed.
160 H.R. REP. No. 115.1, supra note 87, at 1-17.
161 H.R. 1510, supra note 131.
162 Id.
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While the Simpson-Mazzoli legislation provides for positive reform
on paper, serious defects become apparent when it is placed in a real
world context.
IV. DEJURE AND DEFACTO EFFECTS OF THE PASSAGE OF FEDERAL
SANCTIONS FOR EMPLOYING ILLEGAL ALIENS: OPENING
UP PANDORA'S Box
A. The Good Faith Defense
To fully understand the proposed legislation, it is necessary to con-
sider the mechanics of an employer's compliance with the Act. This sec-
tion discusses the procedures involved, the subjective and objective
judgments an employer must make in evaluating a job applicant's creden-
tials, and how compliance with the directives establishes a good faith
defense and fits into notions of scienter. Applicant verification require-
ments supposedly "protect both persons subject to penalties and mem-
bers of minority groups."' 6 9
When an employer becomes subject to the applicant verification re-
quirements, he must attest to the fact that he has examined the specified
documentation of all job applicants being seriously considered for em-
ployment. 170 He must keep the attestation, which also contains the ap-
plicant's affirmation of his legal status, for the later of three years after
the hiring or one year after termination of employment. 171 Attestation
records can only be used for enforcing employer sanctions, preventing
fraudulent misuse of immigration documents or for prosecuting employ-
ment discrimination cases - not in connection with other Immigration
and Naturalization Service activities.1 72 Finally, somewhat in line with
the bill's provision that an applicant's documents need only reasonably
appear on their face to be considered genuine, "it is not expected that
employers ascertain the legitimacy of documents presented during the
verification process."17 Employers who choose to verify documents will
be assisted by the Immigration and Naturalization Service. 174 Appli-
cants whose genuine documents have been mistakenly rejected as being
forgeries also will receive Immigration and Naturalization Service
169 H.R. REP. No. 115.1, supra note 87, at 44; see infra text accompanying notes 217-235 for an
evaluation of the validity of the anti-discrimination rationale.
170 Id. at 44-46.
171 Id. at 45.
172 Id. The fraudulent misuse of immigration documents is prohibited by 18 U.S.C. § 1546
(1982).
173 Id. But see infra text accompanying notes 192, 224.





A number of sources have criticized the burdens imposed on em-
ployers who must comply with the above requirements. Business repre-
sentatives have criticized shifting the enforcement of our immigration
laws onto employers 176 and adding to the tax and other paperwork re-
quirements with which employers must already comply.177 More than
one source has noted the irony of the "pro-deregulation" Reagan Admin-
istration's support for the Simpson-Mazzoli bill with its likely paperwork
burden.1 78  One group has performed its own Executive Order 12291/
Office of Management and Budget cost effectiveness review of the Simp-
son-Mazzoli bill and has found the legislation seriously lacking. 179 For
example, the group found that the legislation is not based on adequate
information concerning the need for and consequences of employer sanc-
tions, a test of whether the potential benefits outweigh the costs, and a
full evaluation of alternatives, such as enforcing existing law.' 80 Accord-
ing to the Office of Management and Budget, in addition to government
and social expenses, time costs per each new hire aggregate to 7.5 million
hours per year plus record keeping, reporting, inspection, and self-moni-
toring.181 Another group estimates the total costs to employers at $100
million per year.' 82 Smaller employers may be particularly burdened be-
cause they lack the necessary administrative support staff.
The employer's good faith defense may not be as simple as it sounds.
The Justice Department has stated that the scienter requirements "do not
require that knowledge be established beyond a reasonable doubt. Once
an employer has been served with a citation and continues to hire aliens
without checking [their] documentation and in violation of the law, we
believe that a case will be made out that the hiring was 'knowing.' "183
By way of comparison, consider the liability of another business entity,
175 Id.
176 KNOWING EMPLOYMENT, supra note 3, at 95. (R. Thompson of the United States Chamber
of Commerce).
177 Id. at 130 (testimony of P. Ellsworth, Executive Vice-President, National Council of Agricul-
tural Employers).
178 Id. at 222-223 (testimony of D. North, Director, Center for Labor and Immigration Studies).
179 No official cost benefit analysis has been performed. KNOWING EMPLOYMENT - COST BEN-
EFIT, supra note 81.
180 Id. at 243-253.
181 Id. at 246.
182 KNOWING EMPLOYMENT, supra note 3, at 151 (testimony of J. Huerta, Associate Counsel,
Mexican American Legal Defense and Educational Fund).
183 IMMIGRATION REFORM AND CONTROL ACT OF 1983: HEARINGS ON H.R. 1510 BEFORE
COMM. ON JUDICIARY, 98th Cong., 1st Sess. 1451, (1983) [hereinafter cited as HOUSE 1983 HEAR-
INGS]. Generally, the government has the burden of proving knowledge. IMMIGRATION REFORM
AND CONTROL: REPORT OF THE SENATE COMMrITEE ON THE JUDICIARY, 98 Cong., 1st Sess. 9
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transit lines, for assisting illegal aliens.' 8 4 The transit companies must
take an active part in assuring compliance with the United States laws
and assume a legal duty to use reasonable diligence.8 5 Finally, letters to
an employer from the Immigration and Naturalization Service's new em-
ployee screening program, "Operation Cooperation," identifying em-
ployees as illegals could constitute notice for the purpose of meeting the
"knowing" and "pattern and practice" requirements.1 8 6  A successful




After enactment of the Simpson-Mazzoli bill, what should employ-
ers expect in terms of actual enforcement? While some estimate that sev-
enty-five percent of employers would comply with sanctions,18 8 a
comparison of the present Immigration and Naturalization Service per-
formance and existing employer sanction laws in Europe indicate em-
ployers have little to fear given the limited effectiveness of both.8 9
Furthermore, limited federal funding and the rigorous scienter require-
ment may make the law more illusory than real. The scienter require-
ment, notwithstanding the Justice Department's protestations to the
contrary,' 90 probably makes prosecution unlikely."' Any effort to in-
crease the law's effectiveness would require the liability standard of a
reasonable man or strict liability which would result in increased dis-
crimination because employers would not risk violating the law.192
(1981). But where just civil fines are involved, defendants cannot expect the same degree of due
process. C. GORDON & H. ROSENFIELD, supra note 14, at 9-6.
184 See 8 U.S.C. §§ 1286-1287, 1323 (1982).
185 C. GORDON & H. ROSENFIELD, supra note 14, at 9-5 to -6, 9-20 to -22. (Reasonable diligence
evaluated in terms of facts, degree of deception, conflicting statements).
186 UNITED STATES COMMISSION ON CIVIL RIGHTS, THE TARNISHED GOLDEN DOOR: CIVIL
RIGHTS ISSUES IN IMMIGRATION. 73 (1980) [hereinafter cited as U.S.C. RTS.] A "pattern or prac-
tice" in civil rights suits means that the act is part of the regular operating procedure. Int'l Bd. of
Teamsters v. United States, 431 U.S. 324 (1977).
187 Catz, supra note 6, at 774.
188 See KNOWING EMPLOYMENT, supra note 3, at 4.
189 See infra notes 193-97 and accompanying text. Employer sanctions in Europe have generally
been ineffective. 129 CONG. REC. S6948-50, supra note 78, (citing Government Accounting Office
report of 20 European countries). Many employers simply internalize the costs of penalties as a cost
of production or evade the law. Id.
190 See KNOWING EMPLOYMENT, supra note 3, at 4; supra note 183 and accompanying text.
191 Smith & Mendez, supra note 118, at 59. In addition, the enforcement of employer sanctions
rests heavily on prosecutorial discretion and the government must overcome pro-corporate jury bias.
See KNOWING EMPLOYMENT - ALT. PERSP., supra note 54, at 339-40.
192 See infra text accompanying notes 194-235; KNOWING EMPLOYMENT - ALT. PERSP., supra




Employer sanctions, if enacted, would become part of a larger body
of Immigration and Naturalization Service administrative law and prac-
tice that provide insight to judicial review and the role of enforcement
personnel at the Service.193 The Immigration and Naturalization Service
is not without its critics who credibly charge that it fails to keep its cases
up to date and inadequately communicates its programs to the public.
194
Further, it has difficulties combining its service functions, that include
administrative and adjudicatory duties, with its enforcement functions
without the service function losing its effectiveness.1 9' In addition, critics
maintain that the system for investigating complaints of Immigration
and Naturalization Service officer misconduct needs revamping 196 given
evidence of officer incompetency and brutality. 197
The Immigration and Naturalization Service has already mapped
out its approach to administering employer sanctions and views its objec-
tives as encouraging voluntary compliance and targeting enforcement to
maximize results. 198 The Immigration and Naturalization Service plans
a program of public information, 199 officer training,2" targeting enforce-
ment to certain employers,"0 ' and imposing a four-step citation pro-
cess. 2  Targeting included "operations based on historical data
compiled against habitual employers of illegal aliens and on profiles of
industries that are known to attract illegal aliens," ' 3 and coordination
193 See infra notes 217-235; see generally C. GORDON & H. ROSENFIELD, supra note 14, at 1-37
to 1-100 (role of various Administration agencies in immigration); 8-52 to -70, 8-120 to -140 (review
of agency); 8-178 (immigration officers have good faith defense from personal liability suits and there
have never been any successful damage suits); 9-59 to -60 (arrests under Immigration and National-
ity Act must be made by criminal law enforcement or designated immigration officer).
194 U.S.C. RTs., supra note 186, at 23-44. See generally Peal, Immigration Bill Hard to Enforce,
Specialists Assert, N.Y. Times, June 25, 1984, at 1, col. 2.
195 U.S.C. Rts, supra note 186, at 23-44.
196 Id. at 117-29.
197 See Chicago Tribune, supra note 103; see generally J. CREWDSON, THE TARNISHED DOOR
(1983). The Immigration and Naturalization Service's "non-management" finds expression in anti-
quated and incomplete records, a lack of computerization, inadequate staffing, top appointees who
owe their positions to political connections and not merit, abuse of overtime pay, and corruption of
service officials. Id. at 113-41. President Carter could not even get an estimate of the number of
Iranians living in the United States when he needed it during the hostage crisis. Id. Officers of the
Service are known to brutally beat aliens suspected of being illegals. Id. at 175. In one case, the
Service deported a 14-year-old Hispanic American boy, who claimed officers had ignored his offer of
proof of American citizenship. See also Chicago Tribune, supra note 103.
198 House 1983 HEARINGS, supra note 183, at 249 (testimony of A. Nelson, Commissioner, Im-




202 Id. at 249-50.
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with the Labor Department and the Social Security Administration." 4
The initial investigation will include a review of employee applications
and eligibility-to-work forms attested to by the employers with an Immi-
gration and Naturalization Service follow-up for questionable records.20 5
Under the Simpson-Mazzoli Act, an employer must make such forms
available for Immigration and Naturalization Service or Labor Depart-
ment inspection, and a subpoena is probably available if such compliance
is not forthcoming."0 6 The four-step citation process includes (1) a warn-
ing notice that an undocumented alien is being employed having no pro-
vision for administrative review; (2) a $1,000 per alien fine; (3) a
subsequent $2,000 per alien fine after the first fine is administratively fi-
nal; and then (4) a $3,000 fine per alien and criminal sanctions after civil
fines are final.20 7 The Department of Justice has testified that it favors
leaving to Immigration and Naturalization Service discretion how the
targeting approach should be implemented0 8 and to the Attorney Gen-
eral's discretion the choice between injunctive remedies or criminal sanc-
tions in the case of repeated violations.209 But the Justice Department
has indicated that it favors fixed fines.210
One probable consequence of sanctions may be that the Immigration
and Naturalization Service will no longer receive an employer's permis-
sion to enter his business and search for undocumented aliens, but now
may have to obtain a search warrant since employers will not want to
subject themselves to sanctions.211 In this regard, it is noteworthy that
evidence obtained in violation of a worker's Fourth Amendment rights
may be admissible against an employer.212
Another key to the intensity of sanction enforcement is its funding;
204 Id.
205 See id. at 249-50.
206 KNOWING EMPLOYMENT, supra note 3, at 25-26.
207 H.R. REP. No. 115.1, supra note 87, at 42-43.
208 HOUSE 1983 HEARINGS, supra note 183, at 1454-55.
209 Id. at 1451.
210 Id. at 1453.
211 KNOWING EMPLOYMENT - ALT. PERSP., supra note 54, at 420; cf. Immigration and Natu-
ralization Service v. Delgado, 52 U.S.L.W. 4436 (U.S. Apr. 17, 1984). Immigration and Naturaliza-
tion Service reliance on a generalized warrant or employer permission justifies a full factory survey
where workers are questioned about their citizenship by agents dispensed throughout the workplace
and stationed at exits. Id. Such a survey is not so intimidating as to become a seizure protected by
the Fourth Amendment. Id. at 4438. Such a survey is a "classic consensual encounter." Id. at
4439. The dissent warned that, "the Court has become so mesmerized by the magnitude of the
[illegal alien] problem that it has too easily allowed Fourth Amendment rights to be sacrificed." Id.
at 4444.
212 Rakas v. Illinois, 439 U.S. 128, 133 (1978) (Fourth Amendment rights are personal), reh'g
denied, 439 U.S. 1122 (1979); cf. Immigration and Naturalization Service v. Lopez-Mendoza, 52
U.S.L.W. 5190 (U.S. July 5, 1984) (exclusionary rule does not apply to civil deportation hearings).
Employer Sanctions
6:203(1984)
many authorities have questioned its adequacy.2 13 While not all the pur-
ported gains of sanctions have been calculated, the Office of Management
and Budget estimates that the entire Immigration Reform and Control
Act will cost $4.5 billion over five years.2 14 But some private estimates
place the costs of employer sanctions at $7 billion a year.215
In light of the above, it seems that an employer who keeps no
records and has no "foreign looking" workers will simply not be singled
out for the limited enforcement efforts the Immigration and Naturaliza-
tion Service is capable of performing.
216
C. Discriminatory Effects of Sanctions
One of the most serious flaws of employer sanctions is that they will
result in massive discrimination not only against documented aliens, but
also against United States citizens of Hispanic origin and other minori-
ties. Employer sanctions serve to place the government between a job
applicant and the employer since the decision to hire must now include
factors beyond the applicant's suitability for the job as determined by the
employer alone. This result seems incongruent in a society based on free
market concepts.217 The government now intervenes to prevent racial
discrimination in hiring through Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of
1964,218 thus also limiting an employer's autonomy in the hiring deci-
sion. Title VII promotes a rational market allocation based on rational
standards of merit - not characteristics of birth,219 but only protects
American citizens.22° With the advent of employer sanctions, the gov-
ernment actively promotes discrimination against applicants based in
large part on their ethnic heritage.221
Several sources have recognized that an unfortunate side-effect of
employer sanctions will be job discrimination.222 Subjective discrimina-
tion will result in three ways. First, employers, facing possible civil and
criminal liability, will naturally be more cautious and suspicious in con-
sidering the employment application of certain individuals. Employers
will target "foreign looking or sounding" individuals, Hispanics for ex-
213 H.R. REP. No. 115.1, supra note 87, at 48-50 (current appropriation proposals).
214 129 CONG. REc. S6956-58, supra note 78.
215 KNOWING EMPLOYMENT, supra note 3, at 171.
216 See id. at 231-233.
217 See Smith & Mendez, supra note 118, at 49-50.
218 42 U.S.C. § 2000(e) (1982).
219 Id.
220 See infra text accompanying notes 271-84.
221 See KNOWING EMPLOYMENT, supra note 3, at 227.
222 Id. at 58 (testimony ofL. Fuchs), 145 (testimony of the Mexican American Legal Defense and
Education Fund), 104 (testimony of the Chamber of Commerce).
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ample, as well as other ethnic groups who have long been associated with
illegal immigration. The Simpson-Mazzoli bill only provides an affirma-
tive defense when documentation reasonably appears on its face to be
genuine. 223 This provision seems to require that the employer judge the
document's authenticity in order to be sure that it belongs to the individ-
ual presenting it.224  The employer's scrutiny will increase for the
targeted groups. At the second level of subjective discrimination, em-
ployers will just "play if safe" and avoid hiring any "foreign looking"
applicants to avoid liability and frequent inspections from the Immigra-
tion and Naturalization Service.225 Businesses with the least administra-
tive resources are most likely to choose this "safe" path.226 Lastly,
subjective, active discrimination will result as employers use the sanc-
tions as an excuse to continue to discriminate or act independently to
carry out their "civic duty.
227
Advocates of sanctions insist that an effective brake on illegal immi-
gration will diminish xenophobia and exploitation of low-skilled work-
ers.228 Hispanics, for example, may no longer be blamed for "taking"
jobs.229 Further, advocates point out that employers must check the iden-
tification of all applicants being seriously considered,2 3' not just Hispan-
ics. Finally, they advance fraud-proof identification as the ultimate
solution to resulting discrimination because the identification would sup-
posedly eliminate the employers' subjective determinations over a docu-
ment's validity.23'
But employers can discriminate against minority job applicants by
refusing to acknowledge that the identification picture matches its holder
even when they do match.232 In addition, government employees can
refuse, for discriminatory reasons, to issue the national identification
card to certain applicants.233 Whether existing identification or a na-
tional identification card is used, "it is apparent that low-income, mar-
223 H.R. REP. No. 115.1, supra note 87, at 74 (new section 274(A)(b)).
224 Pandya, Parker, & Glitzenstein, Discriminatory Effects of Employer Sanctions Programs
Under Consideration By the Select Commission on Immigration and Refugee Policy (1980) (paper by
Georgetown University Institute for Public Representation) [hereinafter cited as KNOWING EM-
PLOYMENT - DISCR.], reprinted in KNOWING EMPLOYMENT, supra note 3, at 260.
225 KNOWING EMPLOYMENT - COST BENEFITS, supra note 81, at 248.
226 U.S.C. RTS., supra note 186, at 62-63.
227 KNOWING EMPLOYMENT - DISCR., supra note 224, at 256.
228 KNOWING EMPLOYMENT, supra note 3, at 138.
229 See id.
230 KNOWING EMPLOYMENT, supra note 3, at 51 (testimony of Sen. Simpson, Wyoming).






ginally employed persons. . .will often not have generated the records
required for work authorization. '234 These people will become the new,
exploitable "illegals."
In sum, employer sanctions will create an environment for discrimi-
nation much as they have in Europe where frequent identity checks of
blacks by police have resulted in resentment and some disturbances.235
Serious doubts exist as to whether statutory or constitutional safe-
guards can prevent the range of discriminatory side effects of employer
sanctions. New complaints of discrimination arising from sanctions will
increase the already heavy work load of the Equal Employment Oppor-
tunity Commission.
D. Legal Consequences of Employment Discrimination in the
Context of Employer Sanctions
1. Introduction and the Fourteenth Amendment
This section explores the constitutionality of employer sanctions and
the liability facing employers complying with them, under both strict
scrutiny and rational relation tests. It will examine the rights of citizens,
legal aliens and undocumented aliens to equal treatment under the Con-
stitution's Thirteenth and Fourteenth Amendments and Title VII of the
Civil Rights Act of 1964, and explore whether employer sanctions may
violate those rights. The section distinguishes between an incident aris-
ing from an intent to discriminate and one which simply results in an
impact disproportionately burdensome to a certain ethnic group.
Any due process or equal rights protection inquiry into employer
sanctions must first acknowledge that the Supreme Court has long "char-
acterized the power to exclude aliens as political in nature and com-
pletely immune from judicial scrutiny. '2 36 Yet "in recent years the
courts have been increasingly reluctant to endorse the theory of absolute
legislative power to direct expulsions ' 2 37 and, of course, employer sanc-
tions involve much more than just expulsions. Further, in terms of
standing, "when a government prohibition or restriction imposed on one
party causes specific harm to [a] third party, harm that a constitutional
provision or statute was intended to prevent, the indirectness of the in-
jury does not necessarily deprive the person harmed of standing to vindi-
234 KNOWING EMPLOYMENT - DISCR., supra note 224, at 267.
235 KNOWING EMPLOYMENT, supra note 3, at 206 (testimony of J. Miller). But see id. at 216.
236 See C. GORDON & H. ROSENPIELD, supra note 14, at 1-34; Harisiades v. Shaughnessy, 342
U.S. 580, 588-89 (1952).
237 C. GORDON & H. ROSENFIELD, supra note 14, at 1-35. •
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cate his rights. ' 238 In other words, parties discriminated against because
of the enactment of employer sanctions should have standing to chal-
lenge the legislation.
Before considering potential violations of due process and equal pro-
tection, it is important to distinguish between undocumented aliens, legal
aliens, and Hispanic American citizens. As a major treatise has stated,
in many respects an alien in the United States has equality of status with
America citizens. But in other respects his status is still inferior. These
disparities are perhaps in part a survival of ancient hostility to the stranger
and in part the reflection of incomplete identification with the nation and
239community.
While the protections afforded by the Constitution's Fifth and Four-
teenth Amendments generally apply to documented and undocumented
aliens, there are some limits relative to rights in ownership, residency and
employment.240 But in contrast to an illegal alien, "a resident alien's
right to earn a livelihood is assured by the Fifth and Fourteenth Amend-
ments and treaty provisions with various nations."241 The federal em-
ployer sanctions would provide the necessary state action to invoke the
Fourteenth Amendment to protect an individual's basic right to pursue
employment. 242 A state may enact hiring restrictions on legal aliens,
however, where jobs involve the formulation or discretionary execution
of state policy. 243 This exception includes, for example, employment in
police departments and public schools.2' Finally, the right to receive
state government benefits is basically established for legal aliens and to
some degree recognized for- undocumented aliens.245 At least one deci-
238 Warth v. Seldin, 422 U.S. 490, 505 (1975) (such indirectness can, however, make it more
difficult to achieve standing).
239 C. GORDON & H. ROSENFIELD, supra note 14, at 1-162; Yick Wo v. Hopkins, 118 U.S. 220,
226 (1886) (holding that the Fourteenth Amendment is not confined to citizens).
240 C. GORDON & H. ROSENFIELD, supra note 14, at 1-163 to -164; Hellenic Lines Ltd. v.
Rhoditis, 398 U.S. 306, reh'g denied, 400 U.S. 856 (1970) (certain constitutional rights apply to
undocumented aliens including protections of the First, Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments).
241 C. GORDON & H. ROSENFIELD, supra note 14, at 1-168; Truax v. Raich, 239 U.S. 33 (1915)
(state may not preempt congressional control over immigration by prohibiting employers of more
than five persons from employing more than 20% aliens).
242 Hampton v. Mow Sun Wong, 426 U.S. 88, 116 (1976) (Civil Service Commission cannot ban
alien employment in federal government). By Executive Order No. 11,935, now aliens are banned
from much federal employment in the interests of national security and reducing domestic unem-
ployment. Smith & Mendez, supra note 118, at 44-58; Vergara v. Hampton, 581 F.2d 1281, 1284
(7th Cir. 1978) (upholds the validity of the executive order), cert. denied, 441 U.S. 905 (1979).
243 C. GORDON & H. ROSENFIELD, supra note 14, at 1-172 to -174; see Comment, supra note 116,
at 695 n.81.
244 See Comment, supra note 116, at 695 n.81.




sion has held that undocumented aliens are persons within the meaning
of the Fourteenth Amendment.246 Legal and illegal aliens' right to fed-
eral funds, however, is much more limited.247
Thus, it appears that the result of an equal protection attack on em-
ployer sanctions is uncertain. Whether all classifications based on nonci-
tizenship constitute a suspect class and therefore deserve strict scrutiny is
open to question. All such classifications do seem aimed at the requisite
particular minorities with a history of discrimination and with little
political power.2 48 But noncitizenship is not an immutable characteris-
tic.249 On balance, except where national security or a delegation of state
power is involved, 50 legal aliens would seem to be fully covered under
the Fourteenth Amendment. But the case of sanctions against illegal im-
migrants seems to be part of Congress' immigration powers2 5' or, alter-
natively, involves one of the rare compelling interests necessary to
uphold a suspect classification. At present, the only case upholding ex-
plicit racial discrimination is Korematsu v. United States,2 ' where Japa-
nese Americans were forced away from their West Coast homes for
"compelling" national security reasons during World War II. It would
seem that illegals do not threaten national security as much as they may
negatively affect employment opportunities for Americans.
Although it may constitutionally discriminate against illegal aliens,
Congress probably cannot discriminate against legal aliens and certainly
cannot discriminate against Hispanic Americans. Yet, as discussed pre-
viously, employer sanctions will probably result in discrimination against
legal aliens and Hispanic Americans.2" 3 Legislative classifications that
are intrinsically open to discriminatory use, even those that are facially
neutral, violate the Fourteenth Amendment unless they meet a very high
standard. 54 That standard invokes a heavy burden of justification in
which the legislation is upheld only "if it is necessary, not merely ration-
ally related, to a permissable state policy." '55 But unlike Yick Wo v.
246 Plyler v. Doe, 457 U.S. 202 (1982), reh'g denied, 458 U.S. 1131 (1982) (public school educa-
tion is a protected right).
247 HOUSE 1983 HEARINGS, supra note 183, at 1403-1406.
248 L. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 1052-56 (1978).
249 Id.
250 See Comment, supra note 116, at 695 n.81.
251 See C. GORDON & H. ROSENFIELD, supra note 14, at 1-34; Harisiades, 342 U.S. 580.
252 323 U.S. 214 (1944).
253 See supra text accompanying notes 217-35.
254 Yick Wo, 118 U.S. at 356; see generally KNOWING EMPLOYMENT - DISCR., supra note 224,
at 306-07.
255 McLaughlin v. Florida, 379 U.S. 184, 196 (1964), (state statute, prohibiting unmarried black/
white couple from living together, held invalid). Unlike McLaughlin, employer sanctions contain no
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Hopkins 256 where the government action was clearly aimed at closing
down the laundries of all aliens, here only undocumented aliens can be
legally discriminated against. The inquiry must thus look to the discrim-
inatory impact on the clearly protected legal aliens and Hispanic Ameri-
cans. Recently, however, the Supreme Court has generally required
more than discriminatory impact. The Court has required a showing of
intent to discriminate to constitute a Constitutional violation.257
2. Due Process
In terms of due process, four separate challenges can be made
against employer sanctions.25 First, due process may be violated be-
cause "questionable" job applications are denied consideration without a
hearing.259 Second, employer sanctions may be in fact unrelated to the
government's objectives of controlling the borders and protecting Ameri-
can jobs. 6° There is evidence presented in this Comment that no such
relationship may exist.261 Third, sanction classification may be in fact
both over and under-inclusive.262 For example, American citizens with-
out documentation may be considered illegal263 and some illegals will
obtain fraudulent identification and receive jobs. Finally, employer sanc-
tions may involve a vague delegation of legislative power to the Executive
and to private employers who actually screen applicants, thus rendering
foreign-looking and sounding individuals vulnerable to arbitrary and ca-
pricious determinations.264
3. Statutory Protections
A private employer who discriminates against an Hispanic Ameri-
can or a documented alien may be liable under both Title VII of the Civil
explicit racial classifications, but the classification by citizenship serves the same purpose because in
the labor context it is so closely linked with Hispanics.
256 118 U.S. at 356.
257 TRIBE, supra note 248, at 1028-32; Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229 (1976) (black police
candidates who suffer a disproportionately greater test failure cannot seek a strict scrutiny analysis
of their case by the Court because no intent to discriminate was alleged).
258 See generally KNOWING EMPLOYMENT - DISCR., supra note 224, at 303-06.
259 Cf. Vitek v. Jones, 445 U.S. 480 (1980) (the Constitution requires due process safeguards
before a state prisoner is transferred to a mental institution); see KNOWING EMPLOYMENT -
DISCR., supra note 224, at 304.
260 See supra text accompanying notes 84-97.
261 See infra text accompanying notes 333-36.
262 Cf. Cleveland Board of Educ. v. LaFleur, 414 U.S. 632 (1974) (Powell, J. concurring) (the
Fourteenth Amendment prohibits overbroad classifications when they infringe on basic constitu-
tional liberties and where more exact measures are available).




Rights Act of 1964265 and 42 U.S.C. § 198 1.266 If an Hispanic American
citizen can prove that another identifiable class of job applicants received
more favorable treatment from the defendant employer because of a class
distinction and not because of the employer's honest attempt to comply
with the law, the Hispanic American can received equitable and legal
relief, such as reinstatement and damages, under 42 U.S.C. § 198 1.267
The courts are split, however, concerning the right of an alien, even a
documented one, to claim similar protection under 42 U.S.C. § 1981.268
At least one commentator predicts that the Supreme Court would ex-
clude aliens from § 1981's coverage because such a holding would be
consistent with application of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 to
aliens.269
Generally, all aliens may bring suit in a United States court.270 In
Espinoza v. Farah Mfg.,271 however, the Court held that the protection
under Title VII of the Civil Rights of 1964 against discrimination based
on national origin does not include discrimination based on noncitizen-
ship.272 Nevertheless, the Court suggested that an employer could not
discriminate solely against the aliens of a certain country.273 Thus an
employer may discriminate against any Hispanic in the course of hiring
as long as he does so because of the applicant's apparent lack of citizen-
ship generally, not his Mexican citizenship specifically. This decision is
inconsistent with established precedent in the area of Title VII and un-
dercuts the spirit of the legislation. "The language of Title VII makes
plain the purpose of Congress to assure equality of employment opportu-
265 42 U.S.C. § 2000(e) (1982).
266 42 U.S.C. § 1981 (1982) comes from the enabling provisions of the Thirteenth Amendment
which guaranteed all the rights that whites enjoy.
267 See LaFore v. Emblem Tape & Label Co., 448 F. Supp. 824 (D.C. Col. 1978) (Mexican-
American plaintiff alleged employment terminated only because of his color/race/national origin).
268 Guerra v. Manchester Terminal Corp., 498 F.2d 641, 653-55 (5th Cir. 1974) (Private and
public employment practice by employer and union that discriminate on the basis of citizenship
violates 42 U.S.C. § 1981 (1982), which guarantees all persons in the United States the same privi-
leges, rights, and immunities enjoyed by white citizens), reh'g denied, 503 F.2d 567 (5th Cir. 1974).
But see DeMalherbe v. Int'l Union of Elevator Constructors, 438 F. Supp. 1121, 1136-42 (N.D. Cal.
1977) (§ 1981 only covers discrimination against aliens by a public entity).
269 Smith & Mendez, supra note 118, at 26.
270 C. GORDON & H. ROSENEIELD, supra note 14, at 1-182; Artega v. Allen, 99 F.2d 509, 510
(5th Cir. 1938) (there is no need for an alien to even show he is legally in the United States in order
to bring suit. [D]ismissed on other grounds).
271 Espinoza v. Farah Mfg. Co., 414 U.S. 86 (1973) (legal alien refused employment solely be-
cause of her citizenship; most of defendants' plant staffed with Hispanic American citizens).
272 Id. The dissent agreed with the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission "that discrimi-
nation on the basis of alienage always has the effect of discrimination on the basis of national origin."
Id. at 99 (Douglas, J. dissenting).
273 Id. at 96.
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nity and to eliminate those discriminatory practices and devices which
have fostered racially stratified job environments to the disadvantage of
minority citizens.""27 Further, "subjectivity in hiring decisions is a ready
vehicle for discrimination whether intentional or not, that has been con-
demned by the courts. ' 27 5 Finally, in contrast to a claim under the Four-
teenth Amendment, which requires a showing of intent, Title VII
prohibits employment qualifications that disproportionately and nega-
tively affect minorities where the qualifications have nothing to do with
the ability needed to do the job.27 6 Here the disproportionate impact
falls on legal aliens and Hispanic Americans taken to be illegal aliens by
employers.
Ordinarily, an Hispanic American citizen would make out a prima
facie Title VII case if he applied for a job, was qualified, was rejected, and
the position remained open.2 77 Assuming that the employer did not ad-
mit that the rejection was based on the applicant's foreign appearance,
the employer could rebut any discrimination charge with a legitimate
rationale.278 Since an employer can choose to further business goals over
the commitment to consider all applicants,279 and since he can rebut the
claim with only a legitimate rationale rather than the more rigorous re-
quirement to prove the absence of a discriminatory motive,280 the af-
fected Hispanic who has truly suffered employment discrimination has
little hope. The effort to comply with the employer sanction law seems
to provide the perfect, "legitimate" rationale.
The Justice Department and others, however, reject the above rea-
soning in part because employers cannot selectively enforce its require-
ments.281 In the end, whether or not an employer reasonably suspected
that an applicant was an illegal alien is a question for the trier of fact
274 McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 800 (1973), motion to retax costs denied,
414 U.S. 811 (1975); see KNOWING EMPLOYMENT - DISCR., supra note 224, at 299-300.
275 KNOWING EMPLOYMENT - DIScR., supra note 224, at 299; see, eg., Rowe v. GMC, 457
F.2d 348, 359 (5th Cir. 1972) (Title VII litigation).
276 Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424 (1971); cf. Garcia v. Gloor, 618 F.2d 264 (5th Cir.
1980) (court upholds company rule that bilingual workers speak only English while at work in
public areas), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 1113 (1981); see KNOWING EMPLOYMENT- DSCR., supra note
224, at 300.
277 McDonnell, 411 U.S. at 802 (court found the employer rebutted the prima facia case with a
showing that the plaintiff had committed illegal acts against the employer); see KNOWING EMPLOY-
MENT - DISCR., supra note 224, at 301.
278 See infra note 280.
279 Furnco Construction Co. v. Waters, 438 U.S. 567, 577-78 (1978); see KNOWING EMPLOY-
MENT - DISCR., supra note 224, at 302.
280 Bd. of Trustees v. Sweeney, 439 U.S. 24 (1978); see KNOWING EMPLOYMENT - DISCR.,
supra note 224, at 303.
281 HOUSE 1983 HEARINGS, supra note 183, at 1463-64.
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based on the request of documentation, its apparent authenticity, se-
quence of events, and treatment of other applicants.282
Even assuming that an employer cannot always hide his discrimina-
tion behind the sanctions law, Title VII exempts employers of 14 or
fewer workers or employers with workers employed less than 20 weeks
per year.283 Finally, in certain specialized circumstances, "national ori-
gin is a bona fide occupational qualification reasonably necessary to the
normal operation of a business.
28 4
4. Simpson-Mazzoli Antidiscrimination Measures
Variations on the Simpson-Mazzoli bill contain several measures
designed to combat discrimination arising from the imposition of em-
ployer sanctions. First, one version provides funding for semi-annual re-
ports by the President concerning the sanctions' impact on employment,
including discrimination against Hispanic Americans.28 Second, the
United States Civil Rights Commission is charged with monitoring the
sanctions' impact, investigating reports of discrimination, and reporting
any patterns of discrimination that may result.286 Lastly, an interdepart-
mental task force is established with funding to monitor any resulting
discrimination. 2 7 But it is unlikely that these provisions alone, not tied
to any mandatory Congressional or enforcement action, can blunt dis-
crimination. Reporting a rise in discrimination does not deter that dis-
crimination; penalties are the only deterrent. The House bill provides a
Special Counsel to seek injunctive relief and civil fines for employment
discrimination against United States citizens and legal aliens based on
national origin or alienage.288 This protection applies to employers of
four or more workers who are not covered by existing civil rights law.28 9
But the real answer to discriminatory impacts is said to be a national
fraud-proof identification.29
E. Employee Identification System
Business leaders, Congressmen, and the Select Commission on Im-
migration and Refugee Policy all have called for some form of national,
282 Cf. S. REP. No. 98-62. 98th Cong., Ist Sess., at 11-12.
283 42 U.S.C. § 2000(e)(b) (1982).
284 42 U.S.C.S. § 2000(e)(2)(e) (1982).
285 H.R. REP. No. 115.1, supra note 87, at 47.
286 Id.
287 Id.
288 H.R. 1510, supra note 131.
289 Id.
290 E-g., KNOWING EMPLOYMENT, supra note 3, at 50-51 (testimony of Sen. Grassley, Iowa).
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fool-proof identification to implement employer sanctions. 291 The Senate
has delayed any firm commitment to institute such a system because of
the costs and "big brother" concerns associated with it.292 Critics charge
that without a national fraud-proof identification system, sanctions will
not limit illegal alien employment but will increase discrimination
against undocumented aliens and Hispanic Americans.293 Using existing
documentation will result in increased fraudulent documentation294 and
will place the burden on employers to determine authenticity, with many
employers "playing it safe" and others intentionally discriminating.295
On the other hand, the government will face an effective good faith af-
firmative defense from those who check the identification296 of workers
who later turn out to be illegal aliens with forged documents.
The Select Commission has outlined three alternatives for imple-
menting a national identification system: the telephone call-in data bank
system recently adopted by the House, a new single-use employee eligi-
bility card with a data bank tie-in, and an improved social security card
with counterfeit-proof features and data bank tie-in.2 97 The Commission
has estimated that a system would take five to seven years to phase into
America's 100-million-person workforce.298
The annual cost of implementing a national identification and verifi-
cation system is estimated at $1.5 to $3.5 million 299 or more. In the past,
the implementation of other identification systems, such as "foolproof
alien registration cards," have been delayed and exceeded their cost esti-
mates by 500%.300 In addition, they have created a large bureaucracy
and considerable confusion among employers. °1 Moreover, because ex-
isting docimentation would be required to obtain a national identifica-
tion card, fraud could still come into play.302 Of course, there is also the
possibility of "look alikes" exchanging identification. Finally, any sys-
291 See, ag., Id.
292 See, e.g., 129 CONG. REc., supra note 78, at S6927-28 (quoting William Safire).
293 KNOWING EMPLOYMENT, supra note 3, at 55-63 (testimony of L. Fuchs).
294 Id. at 38 (testimony of Treasury Department).
295 Id. at 58 (testimony of L. Fuchs); see supra text accompanying notes 217-35.
296 See supra text accompanying notes 169-87.
297 Id. at 56; see Smith & Mendez, supra note 118.
298 KNOWING EMPLOYMENT, supra note 3, at 57 (testimony of L. Fuchs).
299 Id. at 105-08 (testimony of the Chamber of Commerce).
300 Id.
301 Id.
302 FINAL REPORT OF THE SELECT COMMISSION ON IMMIGRATION AND REFUGEE POLICY:
JOINT HEARINGS BEFORE THE SUBCOMM. ON IMMIGRATION AND REFUGEE POLICY OF THE SEN-




tern of documentation must account for bribes to or carelessness of iden-
tification inspectors.
Discrimination could occur when a government agent, instead of a
private employer, makes a determination concerning the authenticity of
documents submitted to receive a national identification card. Those
"foreign looking" applicants may very well have their documents more
rigorously inspected and not receive the benefit of the doubt.30 3
In addition to questions about the effectiveness of a national identifi-
cation system, there are two major arguments lodged against it. First,
just as the social security card was introduced with a disclaimer about its
use as an identification and information source, a national identification
card, notwithstanding disclaimers, could facilitate a personal information
system to be tapped by a variety of private and public sources.304 Cur-
rently, the Social Security Administration law enforcement offices, the
Internal Revenue Service, the Census Bureau, and public assistance agen-
cies have their information tapped by a variety of outside sources in a
manner not originally contemplated. 0 5 A national identification card
for employment would complete a defacto national personal dossier sys-
tem30 6 and possibly infringe on privacy rights.
Second, a national identification card for employment could very
well become an internal passport for many. If provisions in the bill to the
contrary can be overcome, the identification card could serve as a tool to
immigration officers who are searching for illegal aliens. Currently, an
officer can stop an automobile and detain the driver to check his license
and his registration where the officer has a reasonable and articulative
suspicion that the driver is subject to arrest or where the license check is
conducted on all motorists passing a given checkpoint.30 7 If it became
required, either dejure or defacto, to prove one's legal status by carrying
the national identification card, society's interest in providing Americans
with jobs and a uniform inspection of all could justify searches of work-
ers unable to produce the card. The card also might have to be produced
in conjunction with an officer's right to stop and question the passengers
of a car reasonably suspected of carrying illegal aliens,30 8 especially
303 See KNOWING EMPLOYMENT - DIsCR., supra note 224, at 268.
304 See U.S.C. RTs., supra note 186, at 66.
305 See HOUSE 1983 HEARINGS, supra note 183, at 1434-35 (American Civil Liberties Union).
For example, the Parent Locator Service allows child support enforcement personnel to search "con-
fidential" government and private records to trace delinquent parents. Id. at 1434.
306 See Id. at 1436.
307 Delaware v. Prouse, 440 U.S. 648, 663 (1979).
308 See United States v. Brignoni-Ponce, 422 U.S. 873 (1975); cf. United States v. Ortiz, 422 U.S.
891 (1975).
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around border areas. The reasonableness of the suspicion would be
based on the area, behavior, and physical appearance of the occupants.
30 9
The validity of any subsequent seizure made after a stop to check identifi-
cation would be based on a "weighing of the gravity of the public con-
cerns served by the seizure, the degree to which the seizure advances the
public interest, and the severity of the interference with individual
liberty.
'" 310
Proponents of a national identification card for employment respond
to criticism by promising to insert four legal safeguards into any national
identification system. First, individual information will only be available
for employment eligibility verification.31 Second, verification will only
be withheld if the applicant is an undocumented alien.312 Third, verifica-
tion will only be used to enforce employee eligibility requirements and
prevent falsification of immigration-related documents.313 Lastly, "no
identification document or card. . .can be required to be presented ex-
cept for purposes of the [employee verification system] nor can it be re-
quired to be carried on one's person., 314  The information required
would be of a limited nature, and strong historical and Constitutional
forces would prevent any abuse of the national employment identification
system aimed at undermining privacy rights.315 But, as outlined above,
other national information and identification systems have found use be-
yond their originally intended purposes.31 6 The safeguards have a false
ring because they fly in the face of every citizen's common experience
with the unauthorized use of his social security card to facilitate the
building of a personal dossier. The urge to use and abuse the information
will simply be too great and few will be able to resist law officers' unau-
thorized but intimidating request to show the national identification
card.
F. Impact of Sanctions on Labor Law
Enactment of employer sanctions will arguably have a severe effect
on the ability to enforce various labor laws, including the right to form a
union.31 7 Illegal aliens are presently considered "employees" for pur-
309 See Brignoni-Ponce, 422 U.S. at 884-87.
310 Brown v. Texas, 443 U.S. 47, 51 (1979).




315 KNOWING EMPLOYMENT, supra note 3, at 58-59 (Fuchs).
316 See supra notes 304-05 and accompanying text.
317 Labor Management Relations Act of 1941, 29 U.S.C. §§ 141-187 (1982).
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poses of the Labor Act and permitted to enjoy, to a large degree, the
protections afforded thereunder.318 But the courts have premised their
coverage of illegal aliens under the Labor Act on the fact that an em-
ployer's moral obligation to report illegal aliens to the Immigration and
Naturalization Service is not the same as a legal obligation and such a
moral obligation does not prevent Labor Act protections from extending
to illegal workers.319 Courts are most likely to ignore the illegal status of
workers when an employer's surge of civic duty or ultra-moral conduct
comes after a successful union election. A court has stated that "because
an employer does not violate the immigration laws by employing an ille-
gal alien, these discriminatees [illegal aliens] could not subject [the em-
ployer] to any legal liability by applying for, or receiving,
reinstatement.
320
But employer sanctions would change the underlying premise of
Sure-Tan and provide an opportunity for an employer to establish an
impermissible conflict between including undocumented aliens under the
National Labor Relations Act and the mandate of the Immigration and
Nationality Act.32' Sanctions may even end the complaints of exploited
illegal aliens who may fear that the National Labor Relations Board can-
not award them any tangible remedy, even a cease and desist order and
conditional reinstatement. Such remedies would arguably conflict with
federal law, but the issue is less than clear.322 For example, reinstatement
that is conditioned on the illegal alien's returning to the United States
legally may not conflict with the sanction law.
From the union perspective, if the National Labor Relations Board
cannot protect illegal aliens from unfair labor practices, the unions are
effectively shut out of all workplaces employing illegal aliens.323
G. Economic Effect of Sanctions
This Comment's analysis would be incomplete without an examina-
318 See supra text accompanying notes 56-77.
319 Sure-Tan, Inc. v. National Labor Relations Board, 672 F.2d 592, 601 (7th Cir. 1982), affid,
104 S. Ct. 2803, 2809-10 (1984).
320 Id. at 605.
321 See 236 N.L.R.B. 1627, 99 L.L.R.M. 1138 (1978), enforced sub. nom. N.L.R.B. v. Apollo
Tire Co., 604 F.2d 1180 (9th Cir. 1979) (the National Labor Relations Board should not go into
immigration matters, but the Board must consider modifying its reinstatement order if it subjects the
company hiring illegal aliens to a valid state employer sanctions statute).
322 See Southern S.S. Co. v. N.L.R.B., 316 U.S. 31, 47 (1942) (the National Labor Relations
Board must accommodate other Congressional purposes including prohibitions against mutiny by
seamen).
323 Of course, if unions can limit the use of illegal workers by turning employers in under a
sanction law, they might increase their strength to a degree.
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tion of the debate concerning illegal aliens' place in the economy. De-
pending on the assumptions one holds, employer sanctions will either
increase the job opportunities for legal workers or will increase prices
and decrease job opportunities for all.324 In the end, neither view is com-
pletely right or completely wrong. Evidence indicates that substantial
numbers of undocumented workers perform in both above and below
minimum wage jobs.325 While illegal aliens may fill a need for unskilled
labor in the United States,326 there is no question that they lower work-
ing conditions for some unskilled legal workers by lowering wages and
increasing productivity demands.327
Proponents of sanctions maintain that decreasing the number of ille-
gal aliens will result in a decrease in jobs taken away from legal workers
and will better working conditions for United States' citizens. 328  This
conclusion rests on the assertion that illegal aliens do not often work
under exploitative conditions, i.e., under conditions that are unacceptable
to legal workers because of an unsafe work environment or pay below the
minimum wage.329 At the very least it assumes that once illegal aliens,
exploited because of the threat of deportation, leave, their jobs will re-
main and employers will have to provide better working conditions and
better pay. 3 30 Finally, it also assumes that United States citizens are
ready to take on low-skilled, minimum wage jobs.331 These assumptions
appear to be well founded up to a point. Even if only half of thejobs held
by illegal aliens now were to go to legal workers, the unemployment rate
would decrease drastically.332 On the other hand, if United States citi-
zens are prepared to accept these jobs, why employ a workforce which is
always susceptible to deportation? To assume all employers will upgrade
324 See U.S.C. RTS., supra note 186, at 58 n.4 ("replacement" and "segmentation" analysis
respectively).
325 Cf. infra note 333.
326 See supra note 324 and accompanying text.
327 Wachter, The Labor Market and Illegal Immigration: The Outlook for the 1980's, 33 Indus. &
Lab. Rel. Rev. 342, 343 (1980).
328 KNOWING EMPLOYMENT, supra note 3, at 220 (testimony of D. North); H.R. REP. No.
115.1, supra note 87, at 96-97.
329 See KNOWING EMPLOYMENT, supra note 3, at 98 (Chamber of Commerce citing a 1981 Gov-
ernment Accounting Office report).
330 See id. at 180 (testimony of M. Cooper, National Urban League). But see infra text accompa-
nying notes 337-43.
331 See H.R. REP. No. 115.1, supra note 87, at 96 (29 million Americans were in low skill jobs in
1982 and in 1981, 20.5 million worked below, at, or very near the minimum wage). But see infra text
accompanying notes 333-36.
332 R. EHNENBERG & R. SMITH, MODERN LABOR ECONOMICS: THEORY AND PUBLIC POLICY
290 (1982). A 1979 Labor Department estimate argued that unemployment under these circum-
stances would go from 6% to 3.7%. Id.
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conditions as soon as illegals are unavailable ignores the reality of low-
cost foreign competition.
Rather than taking jobs from legal workers, most undocumented
aliens toil in a secondary labor market under exploitative conditions un-
acceptable to most legal workers. Detractors of sanctions point to expert
testimony that undocumented aliens have displaced less than 100,000
legal workers333 and studies showing that there is no correlation between
the number of undocumented aliens in a particular area and that region's
unemployment rate.334 Roger Waldinger, of the Massachusetts Institute
of Technology, has stated that this "segmentation" analysis rests on a
view of the economy as highly stratified: "The incompatibility between
the job characteristics of the low wage sector and the work orientation
for the second generation [immigrants such as Blacks and Puerto Ricans]
has made the low-wage sector dependent on a fresh source of migrant
labor such as illegal aliens from Mexico. ' 335 Faced with these realities,
employers will choose from among three options: ignore sanctions, inter-
nalize the costs associated with upgrading working conditions to attract
United States citizens, or move operations abroad.3 3 6
There is no question that employers may simply ignore employer
sanction laws because of the advantages gained in exploiting aliens.337
For those employers already violating a host of minimum wage, Fair La-
bor Act, Occupational Safety and Health Act, and tax laws, the risk of
increased potential liability can be easily accepted. 338 Moreover, for the
few employers who now comply with the law generally but do retain
illegal aliens as employees, sanctions will encourage violations of the full
range of workplace laws because an employer may feel he has nothing to
lose.339 The sweatshops of the United States will simply go on as
before. 34
Alternatively, employers facing possible criminal prosecution will
333 See KNOWING EMPLOYMENT, supra note 3, at 53 (testimony of L. Fuchs).
334 Id. at 99 (testimony of the Chamber of Commerce). Here a Chamber of Commerce survey,
using Labor Department and Immigration and Naturalization Service statistics, shows that sunbelt
cities with large numbers of illegal aliens also maintain a low unemployment rate. Id. However, this
could be more a function of a generally robust, sun belt economy. Id.
335 KNOWING EMPLOYMENT, supra note 3, at 158 (R. Waldinger paper).
336 See generally M. PIORE, THE "ILLEGAL ALIENS" DEBATE MISSES THE BOAT, WORKING
PAPERS FOR A NEW SOCIETY 60-69 (1978) [hereinafter cited as PIORE]; 123 CONG. R c. H22725-
22732 (July 13, 1977) (statement of Rep. Holtzman).
337 Cf. infra note 340.
338 See KNOWING EMPLOYMENT, supra note 3, at 162-63 (R. Waldinger).
339 Id.
340 See generally Serrin, Combating Garment Sweatshops is an Almost Futile Task, N.Y. Times,
Oct. 13, 1983, at B1, col. 2; Buck, The New Sweatshop: A Penny for Your Collar, N.Y. Times, Jan.
29, 1979, at 42-46.
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upgrade their facilities and benefits and thereby attract legal workers.
Instead of internalizing the cost of fines, employers will internalize the
new labor cost. Eventually, these higher labor costs will be passed on to
consumers in the form of higher prices.3 41
But there will come a point where costs cannot be passed on to con-
sumers without losing out to competition based in countries with low
labor costs. Here a business will find it cost-effective to relocate in the
Third World, taking with it the well paying jobs associated with the busi-
ness.342 On the other hand, United States service industry workers
would, without illegal aliens and no foreign or machine competition, ex-
perience an increase in wages that would precipitate a return to provid-
ing services within the household.3 4 3 For example, high labor costs in
the restaurant business would result in people eating out less.
Finally, whatever effect employer sanctions have on the "pull" of
illegal immigration, the "push" of social, economic, and political slavery
will remain in many countries. Being exploited in a "free" United States,
the "land of opportunity," will continue to look like a viable alternative
for many foreigners even if willing employers are harder to find. At least
some commentators, however, have pointed out that "income differen-
tials (between the United States and its neighbors) have existed without
stimulating immigration." 3" When no jobs exist aliens "return
home. ' 34 5 But the current flood of illegals into the United States in the
midst of difficult economic times, when employment opportunities are
limited for non-legal reasons, belie such rebuttal. Further, political free-
dom always draws immigrants to the United States no matter how lim-
ited job opportunities are..
It seems that any reform of the immigration laws must take into full
account all the economic and political forces at work in causing illegal
immigration.
V. ALTERNATIVES: A BETTER WAY TO TAKE ALICE OUT OF
WONDERLAND
A. Alternatives to the Proposed Employer Sanctions
Detractors of employer sanctions have assembled a host of alterna-
tive methods for dealing with illegal immigration ranging from greater
341 See KNOWING EMPLOYMENT, supra note 3, at 1.
342 See id. at 150-51 (R. Waldinger paper); Buck, supra note 340, at 46.
343 KNOWING EMPLOYMENT, supra note 3, at 150 (R. Waldinger paper).




enforcement of existing laws to new legislation, including modified em-
ployer sanctions, to increased funding for Third World development.
Most opponents of the Simpson-Mazzoli bill, calling employer sanc-
tions both divisive and questionable in effect, have proposed increased
enforcement of border controls and workplace related laws.34 6 Specifi-
cally, increased funding for and greater diligence by the Immigration and
Naturalization Service, Labor Department, Occupational Safety and
Health Administration and Internal Revenue Service could decrease the
level of exploitation currently associated with undocumented workers. If
employers had to pay all undocumented workers the minimum wage,
observe applicable safety regulations, and pay all social security and un-
employment taxes, the illegal aliens would cease to be "bargain labor"
capable of undercutting United States citizens. Of course the employers
might not be able to compete in world markets without cheap illegal la-
bor. This proposal's effectiveness also largely depends on undocumented
aliens' forming a secondary labor market operating under exploitative
conditions. If employers of illegal aliens already comply with all current
laws, then increased enforcement will have no effect on illegal immigra-
tion because illegals are hired for reasons other than easy exploitation,
such as their diligent work habits.347
One of the alternative's major benefits is the absence of increased
discrimination against Hispanic Americans. Employers will have no in-
centive to avoid hiring "foreign looking" applicants who might be illegal
aliens who might subject the employer to sanctions. This alternative also
avoids the sanctions' potential, noted earlier,3 41 for increasing the
number of workplace violations and therefore the government's enforce-
ment burden because employers will have "nothing to lose" in violating
other workplace laws because they are already liable for employing
illegals.349
Another existing law that lends itself to decreasing illegal immigra-
tion is that of requiring the Department of Health and Human Services
to verify the legal working status and identity of applicants for a social
security card.3 5 ° Penalties ensue for giving false documentation for the
application.3"' While the Immigration and Naturalization Service does
not believe that re-issuing social security cards is appropriate, the agency
is working with the Social Security Administration to use this avenue to
346 Eg., KNOWING EMPLOYMENT, supra note 3, at 42-43 (testimony of Sen. Kennedy).
347 See supra note 329.
348 See supra note 339.
349 Id.
350 42 U.S.C. § 405(c)(2)(B) (1982).
351 42 U.S.C. § 408(0 (1976).
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screen out illegal aliens whose potential employers require social security
numbers from workers.352
Another alternative to employer sanctions is the Department of La-
bor's Employers of Undocumented Workers Program, which targets cer-
tain employers for wage law violations and has recovered $3.7 million
since 1978. sss While its effectiveness has been questioned by the Govern-
ment Accounting Office, others defend it and suggest that reforms of the
program involving cooperation with the Immigration and Nautralization
Service could make the program even more effective. 54 In particular,
the Labor Department might encourage "tips" from illegal alien inform-
ers promising to keep their names from the Immigration and Naturaliza-
tion Service.355
The present Reagan Administration would seem particularly open
to a free market strategy to control illegal immigration. This strategy
could take a variety of forms. At one end, there is no "illegal immigra-
tion problem." The law of supply (of cheap labor) and demand (for
cheap labor) should be respected. America as a whole will become more
competitive in the world market and consumers will have to pay less for
goods if unrestricted immigration is allowed. The effect of uncontrolled
illegal immigration on United State's culture and citizens with few skills,
however, is probably unpalatable to the majority of voters in the United
States.
While the author of this Comment believes that certain alternatives
listed above should receive consideration, especially enforcing existing
workplace laws on safety and minimum wages, he subscribes first and
foremost to reform that recognizes the segmentation of the United State's
economy and that protects the civil liberties of aliens and Hispanic
Americans.
First, the Immigration and Naturalization Service needs reform.
The Immigration and Naturalization Service should streamline its opera-
tions and reduce processing delays by increasing automation. 6 The Ser-
vice should put greater emphasis on enforcing the law in a
nondiscriminatory manner and avoid targeting Hispanics.35 7 It should
352 KNOWING EMPLOYMENT, supra note 3, at 14-16 (statement of Immigration and Naturaliza-
tion Service).
353 KNOWING EMPLOYMENT-ALT. PERSP., supra note 54, at 353-366.
354 Id.
355 Id.
356 FINAL REPORT HEARINGS, supra note 302, at 158-159. The delay in obtaining legal admis-
sion to the United States is a major reason for illegal immigration because many refuse to wait.
Buck, supra note 340, at 44.




increase its efforts to single out major employers of illegal aliens who
compete with legal workers and place less emphasis on service workers in
undesirable jobs.358 This way jobs most attractive to legal workers will
become available. Smugglers of illegal aliens should also be more fully
targeted for penalties. 359 Legal and illegal aliens in high level, well pay-
ing jobs should be targeted for deportation.36 In sum, the Service
should respect segmentation of the United State's labor market where
appropriate lest the jobs that illegals are forced out of not be filled by
legal workers, who have higher expectations as to what constitutes a suit-
able job opportunity.
Recognizing the United State's secondary labor market, this Com-
ment's author and others consider appropriate increases in guestworker
programs 361 and increasing legal immigration levels beyond Simpson-
Mazzoli figures362 to meet the need for low skilled and seasonal labor.
In order to increase the lure of legal immigration over illegal immi-
gration and also to decrease the exploitation of legal resident aliens, the
author and other commentators advocate amending § 1981 of the Civil
Rights Act of 1870 to prohibit discrimination based on citizenship.363
This would not make discrimination against undocumented aliens illegal.
Section 1981 would provide a better vehicle to protect documented aliens
than Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 because there is some case
law to support inclusion of resident aliens in § 198 1.364 In addition,
§ 1981 covers employment and contracting,365 provides immediate ac-
cess to the courts without administrative remedies,366 incorporates more
358 PIORE, supra note 336, at 63-67.
359 KNOWING EMPLOYMENT - DISCR., supra note 224, at 314. The Immigration and Naturali-
zation Service recently ran an undercover operation where illegals, after learning of "job opportuni-
ties" through a phony service set up by the INS, are allowed to cross the border only to be caught by
INS officials and pressured to testify against the smugglers. U.S. Hooks Smugglers, Aliens with
Phony Jobs, Chicago Tribune, Feb. 3, 1984, § 1, at 15, col. 1.
360 PIORE, supra note 336, at 46.
361 KNOWING EMPLOYMENT, supra note 3, 109-112 (testimony of R Thompson, Chamber of
Commerce); but see FINAL REPORT HEARINGS, supra note 302, at 154-156. The H-2 program al-
lows the temporary entry of foreign workers to perform seasonal work. H-2 workers are certified by
the Department of Labor when it is determined that American workers will not be adversely affected
by their entry. Id. at 61-65. The Simpson-Mazzoli bills provide an additional transitional agricul-
tural worker program for the first three years after the bill's enactment. Id. at 75.
362 FINAL REPORT HEARINGS, supra note 302, at 157. For instance, the bill increases the
number of visas for colonies from 600 to 3,000. H.R. REP. No. 115.1, supra note 87.
363 Smith & Mendez, supra note 118, at 24-28.
364 Id.
365 Id. at 27. 42 U.S.C. § 1980 (1982) provides immediate access to federal court, back pay
awards beyond two years, and punitive and compensatory damages for mental anguish.
366 42 U.S.C. § 1981 (1982).
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liberal remedies367 and a longer statute of limitations.368 One drawback
of giving legal immigrants greater protections might be that employers
may choose to hire only undocumented workers and not legal aliens if
the latter can bring discrimination suits.
Moreover, the author and others believe that employees subject to
unfair labor practices should receive National Labor Relations Board or-
dered reinstatement that is conditioned on their legal work status.369 But
Congress should also legislate out of existence the Supreme Court's re-
versal of the Court of Appeals back-pay and reinstatement remedy in
Sure-Tan. Only meaningful reinstatement and back pay awards will
ensure that workplace violations are reported by undocumented workers
who prize their jobs, and provide penalties adequate to discourage unfair
labor practices, thus decreasing exploitation of illegal aliens and so de-
creasing their appeal to employers.371
Lastly, some critics of the Simpson-Mazzoli bill372 along with this
Comment's author, have their own version of employer sanctions.373
This version would eliminate the Texas proviso or add to the Immigra-
tion and Nationality Act a prohibition against the knowing employment
of illegal aliens. 374 Only employers cited for hiring illegal aliens, how-
ever, would have to report new hirings to the government. 375 No na-
tional identification system would be issued but rather a registration
center would screen applicants and give a cited employer approval to
hire.376 Non-cited employers would have no incentive to engage in "play
it safe" discrimination 377 against Hispanics because there could be no
liability for hiring illegals at this stage, but would upgrade workplace
wages and conditions to avoid being targeted for government inspec-
tion.378 Employers who could show that their labor needs were not met
by legal labor or that labor would cost too much to stay competitive in
world markets would have requirements lowered for wages and condi-
tions and could use guest workers. Government efforts would focus on
367 Id.
368 Id.
369 Kutchins & Tweedy, supra note 44, at 361-62.
370 See Sure-Tan, Inc., 104 S. Ct. at 2816-20 (Brennan, J. dissenting).
371 Id.
372 See supra text accompanying note 15.





377 See id.; supra notes 225-26.
378 HOUSE 1983 HEARINGS, supra note 183, at 1070.
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known hirers of illegal aliens.37 9 The above proposal does not represent a
radical departure from the Simpson-Mazzoli legislation but simply shifts
all enforcement activity and liability on cited employers only. It thus
limits a negative discriminatory overreaction by all employers. Such a
plan also legislatively mandates a targeted, efficient approach to
enforcement.
B. Areas for Future Inquiry
The reader should consider two additional suggestions for dealing
with illegal immigration, although a full discussion of them is beyond the
scope of this Comment. First, even proponents of employer sanctions
recognize that "as long as there is an economic imbalance between the
sending countries and the United States, the pressure to migrate to this
country will continue. ' 380 Proponents therefore call for the long-term
commitments and bilateral cooperation needed to coordinate immigra-
tion law and relieve economic imbalances.3"' For some critics of em-
ployer sanctions this is the only remedy to an illegal immigration
"problem" that is simply a world market phenomenon. 82
A second option is to identify "enterprise zones" where few federal
and state government taxes and minimum wage obligations would apply,
and where government would provide special government training funds
for workers. To participate in a zone, an employer would only need to
employ a workforce of permanent resident aliens and Americans and
avoid hiring illegals.
In any event, further study on the issue surrounding illegal immigra-
tion, and in particular undocumented aliens' impact on the United States
economy, seems called for to assist policymakers in enacting immigration
reform. 3  Policymakers must get hard data on what jobs can only be
filled with alien labor.
VI. CONCLUSION
Illegal immigration evokes strong emotions because it is tied to job
security and xenophobia. But it requires solutions that go beyond these
379 See id. at 1069-70.
380 H. Rep. No. 115.1, supra note 87, at 47.
381 KNOWING EMPLOYMENT - ALT. PEPs., supra note 54, at 348-51.
382 See Worthington, Trouble in a Labor Paradise: US. Plants in Mexico Lose Workers over
Border, Chicago Tribune, Oct. 2, 1983, § 1, at 21, col. 4. American owned "maquiladora" plants in
Mexico, near the U.S. border, used to thrive and contribute to employment in a country with 50%
unemployment while proving highly profitable for their owners. Now they axe experiencing high
turnover and losing employees to better paying service jobs across the border. Id.
383 See U.S.C. Ris. supra note 186, at 58 n.4.
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influences to determine the negative and positive contributions illegal im-
migrants make to the United State's economy.
Several alternatives noted in Section V do just that 38 4 and any solu-
tion to illegal immigration should generalize from them. First, legalizing
the presence of undocumented immigrants in those segments of the econ-
omy that cannot find legal workers will leave government free to expel
only illegal immigrants that truly take the jobs of United States citizens.
Such sanctions promise to be more effective because they do not ask em-
ployers to choose between keeping their business open and breaking the
law. Further, such an approach recognizes that there will always be a
new generation of immigrants coming to and needed by the United
States. Finally, sanctions should only apply to employers notified by the
Immigration and Naturalization Service of the presence of illegals in well
paying jobs. Only those employers would have the authority to check
the citizenship of job applicants. The Immigration and Naturalization
Service would oversee the citizenship inquiry, thus limiting any induce-
ment to discriminate against Hispanics.
R. Paul Faxon
384 See supra text accompanying notes 356-79.
